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  The term “net neutrality” describes various proposals for regulatory intervention 
in the Internet marketplace.  For example, under one type of proposal embodied in 
pending legislation, regulators would ban a broadband Internet access provider (such as 
Comcast or Verizon) from reaching commercial agreements with particular applications 
and content providers to provide the sophisticated quality-of-service techniques needed to 
support unusually performance-sensitive applications and content, such as real-time video 
streaming or multiplayer online videogames.  Such proposals will likely be, one way or 
the other, a principal focus of telecommunications policy for the next decade.  They have 
captured the attention of Congress, where several bills on the topic have been introduced; 
of legal, economic, and technology scholars across the ideological spectrum; and—of 
principal interest here—two key federal agencies:  the Federal Communications 
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.  
 
  Most discussions of net neutrality focus on the merits of the debate:  on the 
substantive costs and benefits of government intervention in the broadband market.  This 
paper focuses instead on the comparatively neglected institutional dimension of the 
debate:  an inquiry into which federal agencies are best positioned to resolve net 
neutrality disputes when they arise.  As the paper argues, the net neutrality controversy is 
best understood as a classic antitrust dispute about “vertical leveraging,” and the 
institutions most likely to appreciate the economic complexities of that dispute are the 
nation’s specialized antitrust agencies:  the Justice Department and the FTC.  Because 
these agencies regulate the economy at large rather than a single industry, they are less 
vulnerable than the FCC to capture by industry factions; they are less likely to develop 
industry-specific bureaucracies with incentives to keep themselves relevant through over-
regulation; and, because of their firm grounding in antitrust enforcement, they are more 
likely to resolve competition-oriented disputes dispassionately and on their economic 
merits.  The paper thus argues for reviving in this context the competition-policy model 
that prevailed for much of the final quarter of the last century:  a regime in which 
antitrust authorities, rather than industry-specific regulators, take the lead in addressing 















Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: 
An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate 
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1
  Several years after its first appearance in the telecommunications lexicon, the term “net 
neutrality” remains elusive, in part because its meaning varies with the speaker and the speaker’s 
agenda.  But at the highest level of generality, the term describes two distinct types of proposed 
regulation of broadband Internet access providers.  Under one type of proposal, regulators would 
draw and enforce a line between acceptable network management practices and unacceptable 
“blocking” or “degradation” of disfavored Internet applications and content.  Under the other, 
regulators would ban a broadband Internet access provider from reaching commercial 
agreements with particular applications and content providers to provide the sophisticated 
performance-enhancement techniques—over and beyond best-efforts Internet access—needed to 
support unusually performance-sensitive applications and content, such as real-time video 
streaming or multiplayer online videogames.  (In a variation on this second theme, regulators 
would permit such agreements but subject them to “nondiscrimination” requirements.)  These 
two types of proposals are distinct but complementary:  net neutrality proponents typically 
advocate both the anti-blocking rule and a ban on (or close regulation of) business-to-business 
relationships between broadband networks and applications or content providers.   
  Such proposals will likely be, one way or the other, a principal focus of 
telecommunications policy for the next decade.  They have captured the attention of Congress, 
where several bills on the topic have been introduced;
2 of Senators Barack Obama and Hillary 
Clinton, who both advocate strong forms of net neutrality regulation;
3 of legal, economic, and 
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 2 
technology scholars across the ideological spectrum;
4 and—of principal interest here—two key 
federal agencies:  the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.  
  Most discussions of net neutrality focus on the merits of the debate:  on the substantive 
costs and benefits of government intervention in the broadband market.  This paper focuses 
instead on the comparatively neglected institutional dimension of the debate:  an inquiry into 
which federal agencies are best positioned to resolve net neutrality disputes when they arise.  As 
I argue below, the net neutrality controversy is best understood as a classic antitrust dispute 
about “vertical leveraging,” and the institutions most likely to appreciate the economic 
complexities of that dispute are the nation’s specialized antitrust agencies:  the Justice 
Department and the FTC.  Because these agencies regulate the economy at large rather than a 
single industry, they are less vulnerable than the FCC to capture by industry factions, they are 
less likely to develop industry-specific bureaucracies with incentives to keep themselves relevant 
through over-regulation, and, because of their firm grounding in antitrust enforcement, they are 
more likely to resolve competition-oriented disputes dispassionately and on their economic 
merits.  I would thus revive in this context the competition-policy model that prevailed for much 
of the final quarter of the last century:  a regime in which antitrust authorities, rather than 
industry-specific regulators, take the lead in addressing vertical-leveraging claims against 
providers of telecommunications transmission platforms. 
  This paper is divided into three main parts.  Part I gives a brief primer on the contours of 
the net neutrality dispute and explains why, at bottom, net neutrality proposals could make sense 
only as claims about the proper application of antitrust-oriented concepts to the broadband 
marketplace.  Part II then addresses the present institutional arrangements for addressing the net 
                                                                                                                                                             
commitment to network neutrality.’”).  Senators Clinton and Obama have both cosponsored net neutrality legislation 
that contains what I describe, in Part I.B below, as the “strong” form of access-tiering restrictions. 
4For representative treatments, see Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Net Neutrality, 60 Admin. L. Rev. ___ 
(forthcoming 2008) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1080672#PaperDownload); Keeping the 
Internet Neutral?:  Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 Fed. Commun. L.J. 575 (2007); Edward W. Felten, 
Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality (July 6, 2006) (http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf); J. Gregory 
Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. Competition L. & Econ. 
349 (2006); Timothy Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law?  Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 
5 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 15 (2006); Robert W. Hahn and Scott Wallsten, The Economics of Net Neutrality, 
Economists’ Voice (Apr. 2006) (http://ssrn.com/ abstract=943757); Robert D. Atkinson and Philip J. Weiser, A 
“Third Way” on Network Neutrality, Information Tech. & Innovation Foundation (May 3, 2006) (http:// 
www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf); Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Product-Line 
Restrictions With an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate, Competition Policy Center (July 28, 2006) 
(http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC06-059); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv. J. L. & 
Tech. 1 (2005). 
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neutrality dispute, why those arrangements are redundant, and why such redundancy is 
problematic.  Parts II.A and II.B discuss the parallel inquiries that the FCC and the FTC have 
initiated on net neutrality and describes the complex jurisdictional questions those inquiries raise.  
Part II.C then explains why permitting two peer federal agencies to address net neutrality 
disputes in parallel would systematically skew broadband policy towards inefficient over-
regulation.  Among other concerns, each agency would have an effective veto only over the other 
agency’s judgments that intervention is inappropriate and not over the other agency’s judgments 
that intervention is appropriate.  Part II thus concludes that one, not two, federal agencies should 
be assigned exclusive jurisdiction to resolve net neutrality issues.   
  Finally, Part III proposes a long-term institutional solution for oversight of the broadband 
industry.  Under the arrangement proposed here, competition issues would be addressed by one 
of the two antitrust agencies (DoJ or the FTC); consumer-protection issues would be addressed 
by the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection; and the FCC would maintain jurisdiction over 
residual, non-competition-related issues within its peculiar expertise. 
 
I.  What People Are Arguing About When They Argue About Net Neutrality
  One of the main challenges for students of the net neutrality debate is the difficulty of 
pinning down exactly what that debate is about.  Before addressing that issue, I first review the 
technological context in which this debate arises.
5   
 
A.   A taxonomy of IP networks 
  The first step is to define “the Internet,” the central subject of all net neutrality proposals.  
What we call “the Internet” is not a unitary, centrally managed network, but an interconnected 
set of many thousands of constituent networks.  What joins these networks together into the 
Internet is that each has voluntarily adopted a common protocol and addressing scheme—the 
Internet Protocol (“IP”)—that enables its end users to communicate with end users connected to 
other networks for purposes of exchanging higher-layer applications and content.
6  Most of these 
                                                 
5For a more detailed background, see Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, Digital Crossroads:  American 
Telecommunications Policy in the Internet Age 128-46 (2007 ed.). 
6See  Resolution of the Federal Networking Council, Oct. 24, 1995 (quoted in 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml) (“‘Internet’ refers to the global information system that—(i) is 
logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent 
extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
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IP networks are privately owned and operated, and—significantly—their IP infrastructure is 
often used to provide “managed” IP services unrelated to communications with other IP 
networks over the publicly accessible Internet.  For example, a global IP network provider might 
allocate some capacity on its network for the routing and transmission of Internet traffic but set 
aside additional capacity on the same network infrastructure for the provision of high-quality 
videoconferencing over a closed IP network devoted to a multinational corporate customer.   
  Very roughly speaking, the constituent networks of the Internet fall into three basic 
categories.  First, Internet backbone networks—such as AT&T, Level 3, Global Crossing, and 
SAVVIS—use long-distance fiber-optic cable to connect other, geographically dispersed 
networks, including the networks of large businesses, Internet access providers, and other 
backbone providers.  Second, although large businesses often contract directly with a backbone 
network provider, most end users rely on an access network to bridge the “last mile” gap 
between them and an Internet backbone network (which in turn connects them to the rest of the 
Internet).  Today, most residential consumers, and essentially all businesses with more than a 
few employees, obtain Internet access through a high-speed broadband connection.  As discussed 
below, there is much controversy about how competitive the broadband marketplace is now and 
is likely to become.  That controversy lies at the heart of the net neutrality debate. 
  Finally, the third category of IP networks that participate in the Internet are so-called 
edge networks.  These fall into two subcategories.  The first consists of “end user” networks, 
which range from home WiFi networks to corporate LANs (“local area networks”).  The 
second—of greater relevance here—consists of the networks operated by providers of Internet 
applications and content.  In the commercial Internet’s early years, the stereotypical “edge” 
provider was an entrepreneur who ran a start-up website from a server in his garage.  Today, the 
most prominent “edge” networks feature enormous “server farms” and caching facilities built by 
companies as diverse as service-providers Akamai and Level 3, on-line retailers Amazon.com 
and eBay, and Internet superpower Google.   
  The largest of these edge networks are sometimes known as overlay networks because 
they resemble Internet backbones in their global reach.  They operate by storing (or “caching”) 
copies of Web content on servers throughout the Internet, close to end users in many different 
                                                                                                                                                             
Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) 
provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communications 
and related infrastructure described herein.”). 
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locations, and deploying high-speed fiber-optic links connecting those servers to central 
databases.  By circumventing points of traffic congestion on the Internet, these overlay networks 
give end users faster and more reliable access to a given company’s Web content.  Although 
Google and a number of other large Internet companies have built proprietary overlay networks 
for their own use, many applications and content providers hire third-party providers such as 
Akamai and Limelight to perform this function.  Applications and content providers that pay the 
substantial costs of this function have long enjoyed a commercial advantage over rivals that do 
not (or cannot) pay those costs—because, all else held equal, their consumers receive faster and 
more reliable access to applications and content.  As discussed in Section I.B.2 below, the 
Internet has never been “neutral” among providers in this regard. 
 
B.   A taxonomy of net neutrality proposals 
  Until the late 1990s, almost all residential consumers obtained access to the Internet 
through dial-up connections over the conventional telephone network.  Independent Internet 
service providers, such as AOL and Earthlink, provided the critical gateway function linking the 
telephone network with the Internet.  Customers would call a telephone number associated with 
their ISP’s facilities (“modem banks”); those calls would be routed through the telephone 
company’s circuit-switched network en route to those ISP facilities; and, at the receiving end, the 
ISP would provide the “protocol conversion” functions needed for communications between the 
subscriber’s computer and the servers that provide Internet applications and content.
7  
  The telephone company was a more or less passive participant in this arrangement.  As a 
common carrier, it routed calls to different ISPs’ modem banks in essentially the same manner as 
it routed calls to anyone else.  As a legal matter, moreover, the telephone companies were subject 
to longstanding FCC rules known as the Computer Inquiry requirements.  Very roughly 
speaking, these rules enforced common carrier norms by requiring telephone companies to 
provide the same transmission capabilities to unaffiliated ISPs (and other information service 
providers) as they provided to their own information service affiliates.
8   
  This technological landscape began to change in the late 1990s as residential consumers 
began bypassing the circuit-switched telephone network by using the local cable company’s 
                                                 
7See Nuechterlein & Weiser, Digital Crossroads, supra note 5, at 134-35. 
8See id. at 151-55; Robert Cannon, Where ISPs and Telephone Companies Compete:  A Guide to the Computer 
Inquiries, 9 Commlaw Conspectus 49 (2001). 
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facilities—and the ISP affiliated with that cable company—for high-speed access to the Internet.  
And with that technological change came a lively policy debate:  should cable operators, like 
telephone companies, be required to “open” their broadband transmission networks to 
unaffiliated Internet service providers?  This “open access” debate persisted on several fronts 
until 2005, when, after several years of litigation, the Supreme Court finally upheld the FCC’s 
conclusion that such regulatory intervention would be both unnecessary (because competition 
among rival broadband providers would protect consumer interests) and harmful (because 
excessive regulation would dampen incentives for investing in new broadband facilities for 
underserved residential communities).
9  Meanwhile, telephone companies had begun to offer 
residential broadband connections themselves (through “digital subscriber line” technology) in 
competition with the cable companies.  In 2005, the FCC followed through on its victory in the 
Brand X case by extending its deregulatory regime to telephone companies—specifically, by 
eliminating the Computer Inquiry requirements to the extent they applied to a telephone 
company’s provision of broadband Internet access.
10
  By then, the “open access” debate had begun to seem almost antiquated.  That debate had 
focused on the rights of independent ISPs such as AOL and Earthlink.  It had become clear by 
the early 2000s, however, that broadband technology makes such ISPs, if not irrelevant, at least 
much less central to a user’s Internet experience.
11  In a dial-up world, you paid a monthly 
subscription fee to the ISP, not to the telephone company that carried your “local” call to that 
ISP, and you blamed your ISP if your Internet connection was slow.  In most cases, you could 
hardly blame the telephone company for poor performance, because it was treating a dial-up call 
like any other call and was thus dedicating fixed capacity (a voice-grade circuit) for the duration 
of an Internet connection.  Today, however, you pay monthly fees directly to your broadband 
provider, and if your broadband connection is fast or slow, you assign credit or blame to that 
same provider; you are unlikely to know or care which ISP entity is connecting that provider’s 
local broadband network to the broader Internet.  And as Timothy Wu points out, “[c]ompetition 
                                                 
9National Cable & Telecomm’ns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), aff’g Inquiry Concerning 
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd 4798 (2002) (“Cable Broadband 
Order”). 
10Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd 14853, ¶ 44 (2005) (“Wireline Broadband Order”), aff’d, Time 
Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). 
11See Nuechterlein & Weiser, Digital Crossroads, supra note 5, at 155, 161-62. 
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among ISPs”—the goal of open access mandates—“does not necessarily mean that broadband 
operators will simply retreat to acting as passive carriers in the last mile.”
12   
  But when the air goes out of one telecommunications policy dispute, the vacuum is soon 
filled by another.  Here, the regulatory energy that used to fuel the “open access” debate is now 
spent on a similar but distinct debate:  “net neutrality.”  Whereas open access proposals would 
have granted ISPs like Earthlink rights of “nondiscriminatory” access to the broadband 
transmission platform, net neutrality proposals would grant such rights to applications and 
content providers like Joost and BitTorrent.  Beyond that generality, the term “net neutrality” 
means different things to different people, and the parties to this debate can be vague in defining 
what exactly they are talking about.  As former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris recently observed 
(paraphrasing Phillip Areeda’s famous remark about the “essential facilities” doctrine), “‘net 
neutrality’ has become an epithet devoid of any analytical content.”
13  Our first task, therefore, is 
to pin down the content of that term by identifying the major species of net neutrality proposals.  
 
1.  The anti-blocking principle 
  At the highest level of generality, net neutrality advocates propose two different types of 
requirements:  a ban on “blocking” or “degrading” of disfavored content or applications over an 
Internet access platform, and a ban on (or at least close regulation of) contractual deals between 
broadband networks and content or applications providers for the terms of access to that 
platform.
14  As discussed below, these two types of proposed requirements are analytically 
distinct, although they are often blurred together. 
  The first type of requirement—which I will call “anti-blocking” rules—would address 
efforts by a broadband provider to impede its subscribers’ access to particular Internet content or 
                                                 
12Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141, 149 (2003). 
13Statement of Timothy J. Muris, Foundation Professor, The George Mason University School of Law, Before the 
Workshop on Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Feb. 28, 2007, at 18; 
cf. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841 (1989). 
14Significantly, net neutrality proposals address the terms on which broadband providers offer Internet access 
service to consumers.  Few net neutrality advocates seriously propose that the government disqualify the operator of 
an IP network from by devoting a portion of its bandwidth to particular applications other than connectivity with 
other IP networks, such as cable television service or secure teleconferencing networks.  See Testimony of Timothy 
Wu before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Telecom & Antitrust Task Force, at 7 (Apr. 25, 2006) 
(http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/wu042506.pdf) (asserting that “[t]he best proposals for network neutrality 
rules . . . . leave open legitimate network services that the Bells and Cable operators want to provide, such as 
offering cable television services and voice services along with a neutral internet offering”).  Instead, the net 
neutrality debate concerns whether, and in what ways, broadband companies may treat different types of data 
differently in connection with the retail service it provides to consumers in the form of “Internet access.” 
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applications for reasons that a regulatory authority deems impermissible.  In February 2004, FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell became the first major federal policymaker to address that issue when 
he “challenge[d] the broadband network industry” to honor several “Internet Freedoms” for 
consumers, including “access to their choice of legal content,” subject to “reasonable limits . . . 
placed in service contracts,” and a right “to run applications of their choice,” except where “they 
exceed service plan limitations or harm the provider’s network.”
15      The next year, after Powell 
had left the FCC, the Commission followed Powell’s lead by issuing a non-binding Policy 
Statement that, in substance, embraced his “Internet Freedoms.”
16  T h e  Policy Statement 
provides, among other things, that consumers are “entitled to run applications and use services of 
their choice,” such as VoIP or video, “subject to reasonable network management” and “the 
needs of law enforcement.”
17  At the time, the only documented violation of these principles had 
occurred in 2005, when a small rural telephone company named Madison River Communications 
blocked its subscribers’ access to VoIP services.  It was alleged, and the FCC apparently 
concluded, that Madison River had blocked these services not for any legitimate network-
management purpose, but simply to protect the lucrative access charges it earned for handling 
long-distance calls over the conventional telephone network.  Madison River quickly suppressed 
the ensuing controversy by paying a small fine and pledging to stop this practice.
18
  The FCC stressed in its Policy Statement that it was “not adopting rules.”  Curiously, 
though, it did not hesitate to suggest that it would crack down on any violations of these non-
rules.  And soon after adopting the Policy Statement, it forced two of the nation’s largest 
broadband providers—SBC (now AT&T Inc.) and Verizon—to accept the Statement’s principles 
as binding (though temporary) conditions on the Commission’s approval of their pending 
mergers with, respectively, AT&T Corp. and MCI.
19  For the ensuing two years, however, the 
                                                 
15Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom:  Guiding Principles for the Industry, at 5, Feb. 8, 
2004 (http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf). 
16Policy Statement, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC 
Rcd 14,986, ¶¶ 4–5 & n.15 (2005) (“FCC Broadband Policy Statement”). 
17Id. 
18See Order, Madison River Communications LLC, 20 FCC Rcd 4295 (2005).  For an analysis of the Madison River 
case and its implications for the broader net neutrality debate, see Sidak, Consumer-Welfare Approach, supra note 4, 
at 416-22. 
19E.g., Mem. Op. and Order, SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of 
Control, 20 FCC Rcd 18,290 (2005).  More recently, in connection with approving the AT&T-BellSouth merger, the 
FCC extracted from the combined company a further commitment not to enter into certain arrangements with 
Internet content, applications, or service providers for two years.  See  Mem. Op. and Order, AT&T Inc. and 
BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, 22 FCC Rcd 5662, Appx. F, at 5814-15 (2007) (“AT&T-
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debate about whether the FCC should convert its anti-blocking “principles” into industry-wide 
rules remained quiescent.  The major broadband providers claimed that rules were unnecessary 
because they had no intention of violating the principles in the first place.  And few broadband 
providers expressed any theoretical opposition to the Commission’s antiblocking principles in 
the abstract, at least to the extent they are applied to conventional cable or wireline broadband 
networks.
20   
  That period of regulatory quiescence ended when, in late 2007, independent tests 
suggested that Comcast had manipulated Internet packet headers to suppress its customers’ use 
of BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file-sharing application.
21  The ensuing controversy vaulted the 
antiblocking principle once more to the forefront of the FCC’s policy agenda, as the Commission 
accepted invitations to open inquiries into whether it should enforce the antiblocking principles 
into binding rules—and, if so, how it should distinguish between “reasonable network 
management” and the unjustified suppression of disfavored applications.
22   
  That distinction is likely to prove elusive, and the Comcast case shows why.  No one 
argues that Comcast or other broadband providers can take no steps to ensure adequate network 
capacity for most subscribers by constraining its subscribers’ use of bandwidth-intensive 
applications.  Indeed, the FCC’s Policy Statement conditions a consumer’s right “to run 
applications and use services of their choice” on a broadband provider’s prerogative to engage in 
“reasonable network management.”
23  Defining that “reasonable network management” qualifier, 
however, is no easy task.   
  All broadband networks contain potential bottlenecks of shared capacity.  During peak 
usage periods, congestion in these bottlenecks can degrade basic Internet access for all 
subscribers.  Such congestion poses an escalating challenge for network engineers, who must 
                                                                                                                                                             
BellSouth Merger Order”).  This latter commitment bears a close resemblance to the proposed “access tiering” ban 
discussed below. 
20The issue is somewhat more complicated with respect to wireless broadband platforms, given the more extreme 
scarcity of network bandwidth (i.e., licensed spectrum).  See generally Robert W. Hahn, Robert E. Litan, and Hal J. 
Singer, The Economics of Wireless Net Neutrality, AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. RP07-10 (Apr. 
2007) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983111).  In this article, I focus on the net neutrality 
debate as it applies to wired broadband platforms, including cable and wireline platforms.   
21See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, Evidence mounts that Comcast is targeting BitTorrent traffic, Ars Technica, Oct. 19, 2007 
(http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071019-evidence-mounts-that-comcast-is-targeting-bittorrent-traffic.html). 
22See Public Notice, Comment Sought on Petition [of Free Press et al.] for Declaratory Ruling Regarding Internet 
Management Policies, WC Dkt. No. 07-52 (Jan. 14, 2008); Public Notice, Comment Sought on Petition [of Vuze, 
Inc.] for Rulemaking to Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by Broadband Network 
Providers, WC Dkt. No. 07-52 (Jan. 14, 2008). 
23FCC Broadband Policy Statement, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 4-5 & n.15. 
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cope with the rapidly growing popularity of high-bandwidth Internet applications such as high-
definition video-streaming and peer-to-peer video file-sharing while conserving on costly capital 
investments.
24  Complicating that engineering challenge is an economic peculiarity about the 
retail market for Internet access.  Most Internet access plans today include “all you can eat” 
connectivity; consumers pay a flat fee for a particular level of bandwidth but do not pay any 
incremental per-bit price for causing extra data traffic to cross shared network facilities.  They 
pay the same for a 3 Mbps connection whether they use that connection once a day, to download 
a static webpage, or all day, to download and upload high-definition video files.  There are thus 
no price signals to deter a minority of subscribers from overconsuming network capacity at the 
expense of the majority.   
  The question in the FCC’s current proceedings is whether it is “reasonable” for a 
broadband provider like Comcast to treat the use of certain applications (such as BitTorrent) as a 
proxy for undue consumption of finite and shared network resources and thus limit the 
bandwidth consumed by those applications to ensure adequate network capacity for the majority 
of its subscribers.  Net neutrality advocates argue that the government should ban network 
providers from making such judgments and should force them instead either to increase their 
capacity network-wide (and presumably pass at least a portion of that cost on to its customer 
base in the form of higher broadband rates) or to impose “metered pricing” for Internet access—
a fixed fee for each quantum of Internet traffic for which a subscriber is responsible.  In early 
2008, Time Warner became the first major broadband provider to adopt a form of metered 
pricing by announced that it would offer, on a trial basis, a new tiered pricing scheme under 
which customers would pay a flat fee for a designated level of Internet traffic per month and 
usage-sensitive fees for all traffic beyond that level.
25  Time will tell whether this rate structure 
                                                 
24See, e.g., William B. Norton, Video Internet:  The Next Wave of Massive Disruption to the U.S. Peering 
Ecosystem, v1.3, at 2 (Equinix 2007); David Vorhaus, Confronting the Albatross of P2P, Yankee Group (May 31, 
2007); Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Telecommunications Predictions:  TMT Trends 2007, at 6 (2007) 
(http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt_TelecomPredictions011107.pdf); Yankee Group, 2006 Internet 
Video Forecast:  Broadband Emerges as an Alternative Channel for Video Distribution 6-7 (Dec. 2006). 
25See  Catherine Holahan, Time Warner’s Pricing Paradox, BusinessWeek, Jan. 18, 2008 
(http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2008/tc20080118_598544.htm?chan=top+news_top+news+i
ndex_businessweek+exclusives).  Net neutrality advocates responded by expressing serious reservations about any 
“metered pricing” regime for Internet access.  See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Time Warner Puts a Meter on the 
Internet, Electronic Freedom Foundation, Jan. 22, 2008 (http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/01/ time-warners-
putsmeter-internet) (expressing concern that metered pricing “could be used as a cover for price increases on 
existing customers (bad),” and insisting that “the pricing for ‘overages’ should bear some relation to costs”); Marvin 
Ammori,  Time Warner Goes Back to the Future, Jan. 25, 2008 (http://www.savetheinternet.com/blog/2008/01 
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will appeal to U.S. consumers—or whether they will continue to expect and prefer the all-you-
can-eat fees they have paid for Internet access since the early days of the Internet. 
  In all events, government intervention in this area is probably just beginning, and will 
probably involve highly fact-specific inquiries into the case-by-case “reasonableness” of 
particular network management practices from an engineering perspective.  The problem is that 
regulators are hardly equipped to second-guess, in real time, the decisions of actual network 
engineers about optimal network design in this esoteric and rapidly changing technological 
environment.  Regulators may thus hesitate to invalidate the engineers’ network-management 
decisions—except when they believe that those decisions are mere pretexts for anticompetitive 
behavior.  For example, Comcast’s adversaries claim that it suppressed the use of BitTorrent not 
for any genuine engineering reason, but because Comcast wished to preclude the threat that this 
file-sharing application poses to Comcast’s underlying video-distribution business, for which 
Comcast is said to earn supracompetitive profits.
26  I have no basis for either endorsing or 
rebutting these claims about Comcast’s motives.  My point is simply that enforcement 
proceedings about the propriety of network-management decisions should ultimately boil down 
to disputes about whether a given broadband provider has market power and is engaged in 
anticompetitive behavior.  Like the “nondiscrimination” rules addressed below, these are classic 
disputes for the traditional antitrust authorities. 
 
2.  Proposals for restrictions on access tiering 
  So far, I have addressed net neutrality only from the perspective of the four principles 
laid out in the FCC’s Policy Statement, which focus mainly on the blocking or degradation of 
disfavored applications and content.  A theoretically more interesting net neutrality debate 
concerns proposals to restrict commercial deals concerning superior  access to a broadband 
platform for performance-sensitive applications and content.  For example, the provider of a 
high-definition video-streaming service may wish to pay broadband operators to provide various 
                                                                                                                                                             
/25/back-to-the-future-time-warner-broadband-plan-recalls-aols-walled-garden/) (arguing that metered pricing 
“raises Net Neutrality issues,” because Time Warner is unlikely “to apply its new high-bandwidth surcharges to its 
own product,” and “favoring its own content over other channels or programs like BitTorrent would be 
discriminatory”); Press Release, Time Warner Metering Exposes America’s Bigger Broadband Problems, Free 
Press, Jan. 17, 2008 (quoting policy director Ben Scott:  “telling consumers they must choose between blocking and 
metered pricing is a worrying development”) (http://www.freepress.net/press/release.php?id=328). 




performance-enhancement techniques (such as packet prioritization) needed to avoid the latency 
and jitter problems associated with traditional best-efforts Internet connections.  Or the provider 
of an online videogame application might wish to pay broadband operators for the performance-
enhancement techniques needed to run graphics-intensive, real-time gaming applications 
involving the simultaneous participation of game participants across the globe.  The policy 
question is whether the government should prohibit or closely regulate such “access tiering” 
agreements.   
  Here one must draw an important distinction.  Properly understood, any proposal for 
regulation of access-tiering arrangements is distinct from, and indeed assumes compliance with, 
the anti-blocking principle discussed above.  The question is not whether the government needs 
to preclude a broadband provider from acting as a “gatekeeper,” blocking all data from passing 
to end users unless and until it receives a “toll” from each content or applications provider that 
wishes to send packets over the broadband provider’s pipes.  To my knowledge, no significant 
broadband provider has seriously suggested that it would try to reorient Internet economics this 
way, and any such provider would probably fail if it tried.  Instead, under the much more likely 
scenario, broadband providers would go on providing at least the same bandwidth as they do 
now for most Internet traffic, without any “toll” charge to applications or content providers.  And 
they would charge a fee only to those providers that wish to purchase the special performance 
enhancements needed to run applications that are unusually sensitive to “jitter” or “latency.” 
  Various net neutrality advocates have articulated three alternative proposals for 
restricting such “access-tiering” arrangements.  The least plausible of these, a “dumb pipes” 
proposal, would flatly ban broadband providers from differentiating at all among the various 
types of traffic traversing the broadband platform.  In the words of its popular exponents, this 
approach would be designed preserve “[t]he fundamental idea on the Internet since its inception 
. . . that every Web site, every feature, and every service should be treated exactly the same.”
27  If 
taken seriously, this approach would thus preclude a broadband provider from giving any priority 
to real-time applications that need such priority in order to function properly (such as voice and 
video) over other applications that have no similar need.   
                                                 
27SavetheInternet.com Coalition, Net Neutrality 101 (http://www.savetheinternet.com/=101) (visited Jan. 12, 2008) 
(emphasis added) (on file with author).  In February 2008, shortly after this paper was first delivered, the website 
replaced the words “exactly the same” with “without discrimination.”   
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  Although the “dumb pipes” proposal suffuses much of the popular rhetoric in favor of net 
neutrality regulation, no one familiar with the nuances of this debate actually supports it, because 
it makes no sense in a broadband environment characterized by shared network resources with 
finite capacity.  As Tim Wu observes, “certain classes of applications will never function 
properly unless bandwidth and quality of service are guaranteed,” and depriving broadband 
providers of network management tools could thus “interfere with application development and 
competition.”
28  For example, no one would suggest—in the words of David Farber and Michael 
Katz—that the government should forbid a broadband provider “to favor traffic from, say, a 
patient’s heart monitor over traffic delivering a music download.”
29    
  This leaves the other two types of proposals for the regulation of access tiering, which I 
will call, respectively, the “strong” and “weak” forms.  The “strong” form would permit 
broadband providers to give preferential treatment to certain broad classes of traffic, such as 
video or VoIP, but would ban broadband networks from entering into commercial contracts with 
applications and content providers and charging them for such performance-enhancing services; 
instead, broadband providers could impose incremental charges only on their own subscribers.  
This flat ban on commercial agreements has been a central feature of the best-known net 
neutrality bills proposed in Congress.
30  It has also become a plank in Senator Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign platform:  he “supports the basic principle that network providers should 
not be allowed to charge fees to privilege the content or applications of some web sites and 
Internet applications over others.”
31
  In contrast, the “weak” form of access-tiering regulation would permit broadband 
networks to strike business-to-business deals with given applications or content providers for the 
paid provision of performance enhancements, but subject to kind of “common carrier” rule:  any 
given deal would need to be filed as a sort of “contract tariff,” and the broadband network would 
be required to offer the same deal on the same contractual terms to other willing buyers.  This 
nondiscrimination principle would probably not involve full-blown price regulation, but it would 
                                                 
28 Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, supra note 12, at 154.   
29David Farber & Michael Katz, Hold Off On Net Neutrality, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 2007, at A19 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/ AR2007011801508.html).  
30See, e.g., S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12(a)(4)(C), (5) (2007); H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. § 4(a)(6), (7) (2006); H.R. 5417, 
109th Cong. § 3 (2006). 
31Obama ’08:  Technology (Policy Statement) (http://www.barackobama.com/issues/technology/#open-internet). 
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very closely track the “nondiscrimination” obligations imposed on ordinary common carriers 
under Title II of the Communications Act.
32   
  Advocates of “nondiscrimination” rules are sometimes unclear about whether they are 
proposing the “strong” or “weak” version.  For example, it has been reported that, at a major 
conference on the issue, a leading proponent of regulatory intervention first “advocated a strong 
ban on access tiering in his presentation but, when answering a question from the audience, 
conceded that he would accept a weak ban on access tiering in which a network operator would 
be allowed to charge content providers for prioritization under the condition that the network 
operator did not price discriminate within a category of similar content providers.”
33  Of course, 
both sides of the debate can be fairly accused of rhetorical imprecision. 
 
C.  The antitrust underpinnings of the net neutrality debate 
  Much has been written for and against proposals for government-imposed net neutrality 
rules.  From a high-level perspective, the main question is whether the purported need for net 
neutrality rules outweighs the risks inherent in any government intervention in the economy, 
including the risks of deterred investment and other unintended consequences. 
  Reduced to its economic essentials, most net neutrality advocacy argues that there is 
inadequate competition in the market for broadband Internet access and that the government 
should step in to prevent abuses of the resulting market power.  If each American consumer had 
a choice of ten broadband Internet access providers, there would be no credible basis for such 
rules, because competition would ensure each provider’s responsiveness to consumer choice.
34  
                                                 
32See 47 U.S.C. §§ 202, 211; see generally Report & Order, Competition in the Interstate Interexchange 
Marketplace, 6 FCC Rcd 5880 (1991).  For an example of a proposal in this category, see John Windhausen, Jr., 
Good Fences Make Bad Broadband:  Preserving an Open Internet Through Net Neutrality, Public Knowledge, at 
40-45 (Feb. 6, 2006) (http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf). 
33See, e.g., Sidak, Consumer-Welfare Approach, supra note 4, at 426-27 (describing remarks of Lawrence Lessig). 
34A few net neutrality advocates have contended that, even if a world of perfect competition, regulatory intervention 
would still be needed to address the “terminating access monopoly.”  As an example of this concern, they cite the 
Commission’s need to intervene in 2001 to curb the ability of even the smallest local telephone upstarts to charge 
supracompetitive “access charges” for the termination of the largest long distance carriers’ traffic.  E.g., Comments 
of Google in FCC WC Dkt. No. 07-52, at 19-20 (June 15, 2007) (http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/ 
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519529458) (“Google Net Neutrality Comments”); see also 
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz to FTC Staff Report, Broadband Connectivity Competition 
Policy,  at 2-3 (June 27, 2007) (http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf);  see generally 
Nuechterlein & Weiser, Digital Crossroads, supra note 5, at 310-24 (discussing terminating access monopoly).  
That concern is misconceived.  First, this phenomenon does not arise in an unregulated market; it arises only when 
regulators impose interconnection obligations, authorize providers to file tariffs for termination “services,” and 
permit those providers to impose legally binding charges under those tariffs.  See Seventh Report and Order, Access 
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Instead, the root fear is that the Internet access market is in essence a duopoly dominated by 
cable and telephone companies; that it will remain so indefinitely; and that each provider has an 
incentive to abuse its market power in ways that harm the Internet.  Net neutrality advocates are 
particularly concerned about the risk that any given broadband provider, to the extent it vertically 
integrates broadband transmission with the provision of particular applications (such as voice or 
video), will leverage its power in the broadband market to discriminate anticompetitively against 
unaffiliated applications providers.
35  As discussed below, such “vertical leveraging” claims are 
familiar to antitrust lawyers, and antitrust law and scholarship has developed sophisticated tools 
for evaluating them.   
  Before I describe the economic components of the net neutrality debate, it is worth 
pausing to consider efforts to justify net neutrality rules without relying on competition-related 
concerns.  As I discuss below, those efforts rest either on a basic misapprehension about the way 
the Internet operates or on speculative First Amendment concerns that are problematic on the 
merits and, in any event, could not begin to justify the massive economic regulation that net 
neutrality advocates propose. 
 
1.  Answering the critics of an economic approach to net neutrality analysis 
 
  Some net neutrality advocates would impose net neutrality rules not to avoid any market 
failure, as antitrust practitioners use that term, but to preserve one particular view of the way the 
Internet should operate.  This view holds, in essence, that the Internet should provide as equal an 
opportunity as possible for any given provider to reach end users effectively.  For example, 
Senator Obama argues that the strong form of the nondiscrimination rule is necessary to avoid “a 
two-tier Internet in which websites with the best relationships with network providers can get the 
fastest access to consumers, while all competing websites remain in a slower lane,” and to 
“ensure that the new competitors [at the edge], especially small or non-profit speakers, have the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Charge Reform, 16 FCC Rcd 9923, ¶ 2 (2001) (“[W]e limit the application of our tariff rules to CLEC access 
services in order to prevent use of the regulatory process to impose excessive access charges on IXCs and their 
customers.”).  In any event, as noted above, no one is contending that broadband providers could or should impose 
the equivalent of access charges on applications or content providers in the first place—i.e., fees for terminating 
ordinary data traffic over a best-efforts broadband connection.  See Part I.B.2, supra. 
35See, e.g., Free Press Pet., supra note 26, at ii (identifying “[t]he paradigmatic fear of network neutrality defenders” 
as the possibility “that network providers who compete[] (or [seek] to compete) with independent applications [will] 
secretly degrade those applications in ways prompting consumers to abandon those degraded applications, 
undermining consumer choice, innovation, and a competitive market”). 
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same opportunity as incumbents to innovate on the Internet and to reach large audiences.”
36  
Similarly, a key Senate sponsor of “strong” Net neutrality legislation, Oregon Senator Ron 
Wyden, has argued that business-to-business deals concerning access to the broadband platform 
would have a “chilling effect on small mom and pop businesses that can’t afford the priority 
lane, leaving these smaller businesses no hope of competing against the Wal-Marts of the 
world,” and that a ban on such deals would beneficently “allow[] folks to start small and dream 
big[.]”
37
  This populist vision of the Internet as a massive leveler of economic inequality—as a sort 
of digital Small Business Administration—is problematic as a matter of both technology and 
history.  The Internet has never been “neutral” among applications and content providers,
38 and 
net neutrality rules, standing alone, could not make it so anyway.  For example, certain 
applications and content providers have long succeeded precisely because they have built—or 
have purchased the services of—massive content-delivery networks, which, as noted, circumvent 
points of congestion on the Internet to bring the privileged providers’ data as close as possible to 
the physical locations of their end users.  These CDNs are designed to, and do in fact, enable 
applications and content providers to out-compete rival providers that do not make use of such 
networks.  As Akamai, a leading CDN, explains:   
Let’s assume someone has ten minutes to spend at your Web site:  some are able 
to access 10+ pages, while some can’t stand the wait and give up after two 
requests.  If page speed were to be increased by as little as five times, these 
visitors would have the ability to view 50+ pages during the same short session, 
ensuring a better user experience—critical to your efforts to acquire and retain 
customers and partners.  Increasing page performance reduces the likelihood of 
bailout, boosts the likelihood of multiple page views and purchases, increases 
cross-sell conversion opportunities and leaves impressions that are worthy of 
return visits.
39    
                                                 
36See http://www.barackobama.com/issues/technology. 
37News Release, Wyden Moves to Ensure Fairness of Internet Usage with New Net Neutrality Bill, (Mar. 2, 2006) 
(http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=266467). 
38See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan, The Myth of Network Neutrality and the Threat to Internet 
Innovation (2007) (http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/RP_06-33-
repost1-24-07.pdf); Google Net Neutrality Comments, supra note 34, at 4 n.6 (noting that “the Internet today is not 
an absolutely ‘neutral’ place” in that “the various servers, routers, and content delivery networks that comprise [the 
Internet] can and do distinguish routinely between various forms of traffic”).     
39Akamai White Paper, Why Performance Matters, at 1 (2002) (http://www.akamai.com/dl/ 
whitepapers/Akamai_Why_Performance_Matters_Whitepaper.pdf).  Akamai’s website contains an 
interactive illustration of how much its CDN can improve an applications provider’s performance along 
specified routes.  See http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/dataviz2.html. 
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  In other words, those who can afford the services of Akamai or other CDNs—or who, 
like Google, can make the multi-billion dollar investments needed to build such networks 
themselves—will have a marked competitive advantage over the “mom and pop” sites and other 
Internet companies that lack such resources.  This does not mean that mom and pop sites cannot 
obtain such resources through the capital markets if their business plans are promising enough to 
attract the interest of venture capitalists.  At least in theory, the genius of the free-market system 
is that innovators with valuable ideas can obtain the capital they need to knock off larger, more 
established incumbents.  But if your business plan does not attract the interest of the capital 
markets, the Internet will by all means “discriminate” in favor of Wal-Mart and Google and 
against your on-line retail website or fledgling search engine, because your data will reach end 
users less quickly and efficiently than theirs.  And the Internet will discriminate against you in 
those circumstances no matter how “neutrally” broadband providers treat the packets flowing 
across their last-mile networks.   
  Here is the key point:  no one contends that this differential treatment is even a problem, 
let alone a problem that the government should resolve through “neutrality” mandates.  When 
this is pointed out, net neutrality advocates typically answer that, although CDNs require 
massive capital investments, the market for CDN services is inherently more competitive than 
the market for last-mile broadband services.  Whether or not that is true, the central point is that 
this is an empirical argument about market power and the potential for market failures—
traditional antitrust concepts; it is not an argument about whether the government should 
conform the Internet to some utopian vision of an electronic town hall where anyone is 
guaranteed the right to speak as loudly as anyone else.   
  That point likewise answers the related argument that net neutrality regulation is needed 
to preserve values of free expression as the Internet increasingly encompasses the mass media.  
This strain of net neutrality advocacy, which is often quite vague in its articulation, would 
apparently impose a loose sort of “fairness doctrine” on broadband networks:  a mandate to 
ensure that broadband providers facilitate equal access to the broadband platform by anyone with 
ideas to share.  As we have seen, the government could not ensure equal access unless it started 
issuing vouchers to all Internet start-ups for subsidized CDN services.  Even apart from that fact, 




  First, the American marketplace of ideas has prospered for centuries even though the 
government has rarely given anyone an enforceable right to speak as loudly as anyone else or 
through exactly the same channels of expression.  Indeed, First Amendment jurisprudence may 
weigh against, rather than for, government intervention in this context.  In Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
40 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment invalidated a 
state law that required newspapers to give political candidates an opportunity to reply to 
unfavorable editorials, reasoning that the marketplace of ideas will prosper best if the 
government does not  act as a referee of “fair” access to privately owned means of public 
expression.
41   
  Second, and just as important, there is a radical mismatch between the speculative free-
expression concerns raised by net neutrality advocates and the ambitiously interventionist 
“solutions” they would impose today.  So far, no one has identified a concrete “problem” to be 
fixed in the marketplace of ideas.  For example, even if Free Press’s complaints about Comcast’s 
treatment of the BitTorrent P2P technology were valid on the merits, Comcast’s actions still 
would have been completely content-neutral:  Comcast would not have “discriminated” against 
viewpoints at all, much less in ways that could threaten the marketplace of ideas, much less in 
ways that could justify government intervention to protect that marketplace.  If a discernible 
problem does arise, there will be time enough to contemplate appropriately tailored solutions to 
it.  And even then, such problems, whatever they may be, would be exceedingly unlikely by 
themselves to support the full-blown scheme of economic regulation proposed by net neutrality 
advocates. 
 
2.  The economic elements of the net neutrality debate 
  As noted, the basic premise of net neutrality rules is that cable and telephone companies 
have formed a “cozy duopoly”; that they have excessive power in the broadband Internet access 
                                                 
40418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
41The notable exception to this rule involved conventional television and radio broadcasting.  In its controversial 
(and now highly suspect) Red Lion decision in 1969, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to 
the original fairness doctrine:  a requirement that broadcasters give equal time to opposing viewpoints.  See Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  But the Court upheld that rule only because the broadcast spectrum, long 
considered a public resource, was viewed as so inherently “scarce” that the government had to grant limited rights of 
private access to it in order to ensure genuine public debate.  The contrast here is instructive:  no one would 
seriously argue that Internet has any of the “scarcity” properties that underlay the Red Lion decision.  Any Internet 
connection allows end users to reach millions of information sources worldwide, not the three or four broadcast 
television channels available locally when Red Lion was decided. 
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market; and that, if unchecked by the government, they will abuse that power by harming 
competition in the adjacent markets for applications and content.  Opponents of net neutrality 
rules respond with a number of independent arguments, which I will briefly sketch here.  It is not 
my purpose to take sides on any of these issues; my main objective is simply to underscore the 
inherently antitrust-oriented character of the net neutrality debate. 
  First, the opponents claim that the retail Internet access market is more competitive and 
dynamic than net neutrality advocates contend, and that the potential for further intermodal 
competition keeps all providers in check.  The FCC has essentially accepted this claim as the 
basis for a string of orders since 2002 deregulating broadband service providers.
42  Nonetheless, 
this claim remains controversial as an empirical matter, given the still-large share of the 
broadband market occupied by conventional cable and telephone companies.
43  Relatedly, 
advocates and opponents argue about whether net neutrality regulation would worsen the 
prospects for additional broadband competition.  For example, Chris Yoo argues that, if the root 
problem is an undersupply of broadband access providers, the proper solution is to maintain 
deregulatory policies that encourage new entry into the broadband market by allowing each 
broadband provider to differentiate itself from others.
44  Net neutrality rules, he claims, would 
stifle such differentiation, deter new entry, and perversely solidify the competitive problem that 
gave rise to net neutrality proposals in the first place.  In contrast, Tim Wu argues that the 
broadband market will remain a duopoly for the foreseeable future no matter what regulatory 
steps are taken, and that regulators must therefore focus on preventing the duopolists from 
harming innovation at the “edge” of the Internet.
45  
                                                 
42See, e.g., Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 10; Cable Broadband Order, supra note 9. 
43Some opponents of “nondiscrimination” regulation further argue that, in assessing the competitive forces that 
would keep anticompetitive conduct at bay, one must look not just at competition for end users in the retail market, 
but also at competition for the provision of performance enhancements to applications and content providers.  For 
example, could a broadband provider that observes the basic antiblocking principle succeed in harming unaffiliated 
applications and content providers by withholding performance-enhancing services if independent CDNs can help 
those providers connect just as efficiently with end users?  This issue remains largely unexplored. 
44See, e.g., Christopher Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?  A 
Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 23 (2004); Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo 
Debate, supra note 4, at 587-90. 
45Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate,  supra note 4, at 590-92.  In an important twist on this debate, some 
economists argue that, because of the unique characteristics of the broadband market, even competition between 
only two rivals may suffice to protect consumer interests as effectively as competition among several rivals protects 
consumer interests in other markets.  They reason that the high fixed costs and negligible marginal costs in the 
broadband market give providers unusual incentives to keep and recruit as many customers as possible—and thus to 
accommodate any significant consumer concerns—because each customer represents almost pure profit, in that no 
costs are avoided if any customer defects to the alternative provider.  See generally Timothy J. Tardiff, Changes in 
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  Second, the opponents of net neutrality rules claim that, even if any given broadband 
provider faces minimal competition in its geographic service areas, no broadband provider 
occupies a large enough share of the national broadband market to harm competition in the 
inherently national (and international) markets for content and applications.
46  Net neutrality 
advocates respond that, although this market characteristic may protect the largest global content 
or applications providers from anticompetitive conduct by individual broadband companies, it 
would not necessarily protect smaller innovators at the edge of the Internet. 
  Third, opponents of net neutrality rules argue that, even if a broadband provider faced no 
competition, and even if it theoretically had the ability to harm competition in the content and 
applications markets, it would still usually have no incentive to discriminate against unaffiliated 
providers of complementary applications and content in ways that would harm consumer 
welfare.  This point is complex and warrants brief elaboration. 
  Since the emergence of the Chicago School in the 1970s, antitrust law has taken a 
skeptical view of claims that vertically integrated firms will try to “leverage” their monopoly 
status in one market to harm competition in adjacent markets.
47  From the antitrust perspective, a 
broadband platform provider that is free from retail price regulation (as all broadband providers 
are today) should normally have incentives to deal evenhandedly with independent providers of 
complementary applications—even if it completely dominates the platform market—because 
discrimination in the applications market would simply devalue the platform and, as a general 
matter, would not enable the provider to earn any profits it could not otherwise earn for the 
underlying platform itself.
48  Where it applies, this principle (known as the “internalization of 
complementary externalities,” or “ICE”) does not hold that platform providers will never favor 
their own affiliates over independent companies.  For example, they may favor their own 
                                                                                                                                                             
Industry Structure and Technological Convergence: Implications for Competition Policy and Regulation in 
Telecommunications, 4 Int’l Economics & Economic Policy 109 (2007). 
46Comments of Verizon in FCC WC Dkt No. 07-52, at 50-52 (June 15, 2007) (http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ 
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519529411) (“Verizon Net Neutrality Comments”).. 
47See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 223-29 (2d ed. 2001); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of Congestion, 94 Geo. L.J. 1847, 1885-87 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media 
Regulation in the New Economy, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 171 (2002); see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy 
After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 255-83 (1985). 
48See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:  Towards 
a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 85, 104 (2003).  Under a 
principle known as “Baxter’s law,” a vertically integrated company that is subject to price caps on its platform 
services—such as the pre-divestiture Bell System—may well have an incentive to discriminate against rival 
applications providers in order to recover the monopoly profits that price regulation precludes it from recovering in 
the platform market.  See id. at 105-07. 
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affiliates in order to capture the efficiencies that vertical integration permits
49 or to attract 
consumers through efficient product differentiation.
50  But the ICE principle (where it applies) 
does hold that platform providers will have no rational incentive to favor their affiliates in ways 
that distort efficient competition and harm consumers.  And it should be common ground that, 
with rare exceptions, economic regulation should be designed to promote competition, in the 
interests of consumers, rather than individual competitors.
51
  The ICE principle is nonetheless subject to a number of important exceptions—contexts 
in which vertical integration could give firms with market power incentives to discriminate in 
anticompetitive ways against rivals in the applications market.
52  One of these exceptions arises 
when a platform provider believes that an applications provider poses a competitive threat to the 
underlying platform.  For example, Microsoft, as a monopoly provider of PC operating systems, 
may not normally have incentives to discriminate against unaffiliated applications software.  But 
as the Justice Department demonstrated several years ago, Microsoft did have—and may have 
acted upon—incentives to crush an applications provider (Netscape) that threatened the market 
position of the Windows platform itself.
53  In the Internet access context, an analogous question 
arises about whether broadband providers that face inadequate broadband competition might 
likewise have incentives to thwart applications (such as VoIP and streaming video) that threaten 
any service traditionally offered by a given broadband provider (voice for telcos and 
                                                 
49For classic expositions of the efficiencies of vertical integration, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanics of 
Governance (1996), and Ronald Coase, The Firm, The Market, and The Law (1990). 
50See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
51See, e.g., AT&T BellSouth Merger Order, supra note 19, at ¶ 195 (affirming that Commission’s “statutory duty is 
to protect efficient competition, not competitors”); see generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 
U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (antitrust laws are enforced “for the protection of competition not competitors”) (citation 
omitted). 
52See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 48, at 105-19; see also Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework 
for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 329 (2007) (arguing for recognition of 
additional exceptions beyond those acknowledged in existing economic literature).  Some net neutrality advocates 
argue that, whereas “[a] single monopolist may refrain from [anticompetitive] tactics due to the so-called ‘one 
monopoly rent’ rule,” that rule “becomes less relevant,” and the incentives to discriminate worsen, “[a]s the high-
speed ISP market moves from monopoly to competition,” because each provider will have an incentive to stake out 
“a competitive position in the [platform] market by differentiating itself” from its competitors.  Google Net 
Neutrality Comments 16-18 (emphasis added) (citing van Schewick, supra).  The defect in this argument is that 
product differentiation is a key benefit of free markets; consumers would be worse off if, for example, the markets 
for cars, breakfast cereals, and videogame consoles lacked their current diversity.  See William J. Baumol & Alan S. 
Blinder, Economics:  Principles and Policy 248-52 (8
th ed. 2000) (discussing consumer benefits of “monopolistic 
competition”).  Any incentive to differentiate one’s platform through preferential treatment of certain applications is 
thus, standing alone, not an “exception” to the ICE principle, because the resulting differentiation tends to increase, 
not decrease, consumer welfare.  See Hermalin & Katz, supra note 4; Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network 
Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?, supra note 44, at 61. 
53See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Farrell & Weiser, supra note 48, at 110-11. 
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multichannel video service for cable companies).
54  That is one reason why so much scrutiny 
greeted Madison River’s treatment of VoIP services and Comcast’s treatment of a peer-to-peer 
technology used for sharing large video files.
55   
  Finally, advocates and opponents of net neutrality regulation argue about the costs of 
regulatory intervention.  The opponents first claim that, no matter how these economic questions 
should be resolved in the abstract, policymakers should adopt a cautious case-by-case approach 
to the resolution of particular net neutrality complaints and that, if and when market failures 
arise, policymakers should opt for after-the-fact remedies rather than prophylactic regulations, 
which grow obsolescent quickly in this dynamic market and inevitably create unintended 
consequences.  Unnecessary or premature intervention, they add, would carry enormous costs:  it 
would suppress investment incentives (why make risky sunk investments in a commodity 
product?), deprive consumers of needed diversity in Internet platforms, and open up a Pandora’s 
box of unintended regulatory consequences, all without a showing that regulatory intervention is 
necessary in the first place.
56  Net neutrality advocates assert that these claims of investment 
disincentives are overstated and that, unless the government acts now, broadband providers may 
structure their networks in ways that will ultimately harm consumer interests in an “open” 
Internet and that cannot easily be undone later.
57    
 
3.  Facing up to the essential antitrust character of the net neutrality debate 
 
  No matter how one comes out on these various subdebates within the net neutrality 
discussion, the following generalization seems valid:  Proposals for net neutrality rules could 
have merit only if (i) the broadband Internet access market is inadequately competitive and will 
remain so indefinitely; (ii) such market concentration will give incumbent broadband providers 
both the incentive and the ability to discriminate against specific applications providers; (iii) 
such discrimination would harm consumers and not just particular providers; and (iv) any such 
consumer harm would exceed the costs of regulatory intervention.  In short, the net neutrality 
debate, properly conceived, is fundamentally about core antitrust concepts:  about market power, 
                                                 
54See, e.g., Free Press Pet., supra note 26, at 24-25. 
55See supra notes 18, 21-26 and accompanying text. 
56See, e.g., Hermalin & Katz, supra note 4; Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt 
Competition?, supra note 44. 
57See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas 147-76 (2002). 
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market failures, market definition, and the costs and benefits of government intervention in a 
rapidly evolving, high-technology market.   
  That observation underscores the central question of this article:  Why shouldn’t this 
constellation of antitrust-oriented disputes be handled by an agency that specializes in applying 
rigorous antitrust analysis across multiple industries, rather than an agency that has been devoted 
for 75 years to legacy monopoly regulation of one industry and is subject to infinitely malleable 
“public interest” mandates?  There is of course nothing novel about that question.
58  For much of 
the final quarter of the twentieth century, competition policy in the United States was dominated 
by a generalist antitrust agency—the Department of Justice, which had persuaded Judge Harold 
Green that the FCC was incompetent for the task.
59  DoJ not only forced the break-up of AT&T 
in the early 1980s, but then presided over the implementation of an elaborate, competition-
oriented consent decree for the next dozen years.   
  Of course, Congress dramatically altered that regime when, in the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, it abolished the consent decree and gave the FCC a sweeping new mandate to 
oversee competitive conditions in telecommunications markets.  That legislation marginalized 
not only DoJ’s role but the role of antitrust law in general.  In its 2004 Trinko decision, the 
Supreme Court limited the availability of antitrust remedies in this industry partly because it 
found that “the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to 
be small” when Congress has created “a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy 
anticompetitive harm.”
60  Similarly, in its 2007 Credit Suisse decision, the Supreme Court held 
that the securities laws, together with comprehensive regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, implicitly bar application of the antitrust laws to certain types of underwriting 
practices.
61  Although interpretations vary, these two decisions suggest that, as prescriptive 
regulation of a field waxes, antitrust enforcement must wane.  In effect, the 1996 Act, together 
with the Trinko and Credit Suisse cases, has turned the pre-1996 regulatory scheme upside down.  
Whereas DoJ once displaced the FCC in the field of telecommunications competition, the FCC’s 
current ascendancy has sharply curtailed the role of traditional antitrust enforcement. 
                                                 
58See generally Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the 
Telecosm (1997); Peter Huber et al., Federal Telecommunications Law 402-03 (2d ed. 1999). 
59See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 168 (D.D.C. 1982). 
60Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004) (emphasis 
added).  Of course, that basis for caution in the judicial application of antitrust law would be absent if the FCC were 
deemed to lack jurisdiction over a given regulatory area. 
61Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).  
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  We should now revisit the merits of this policy switch.  The point here is not so much 
that Congress made the wrong choice in 1996 when it subordinated antitrust enforcement to 
prescriptive regulation in 1996, although it arguably did.  Instead, my point relates more 
specifically to a net neutrality debate that was essentially unanticipated in 1996.  Substantive 
antitrust principles already squarely address the “vertical leveraging” concerns underlying net 
neutrality advocacy.  Whatever agency confronts that debate will necessarily be applying those 
antitrust principles one way or another, whether in the context of after-the-fact enforcement 
actions, prescriptive rulemaking proceedings, or some hybrid of the two, such as the creation of 
enforcement “safe harbors.”  We should keep that point in mind when considering whether to 
assign the net neutrality inquiry to generalist antitrust enforcement authorities or instead to 
industry-specific non-antitrust-oriented regulators.  
 
II.  Avoiding Administrative Redundancy in Oversight of the Broadband Market
  Three federal agencies—the Justice Department, the FCC, and the FTC—are 
theoretically equipped to address net neutrality disputes, and the FCC and the FTC have already 
taken steps to assert jurisdiction in this area.  But both the FCC and the FTC, and much of the 
industry itself, appear oblivious to the risk that, by simultaneously exercising such jurisdiction, 
these two agencies could duplicate each other’s efforts in deeply inefficient ways, and that the 
ensuing regime would deepen regulatory uncertainty and systematically err on the side of 
excessive intervention.  Let us briefly recount how we arrived at this point, first by examining 
the FCC’s net neutrality initiatives and then turning to the FTC’s parallel initiatives. 
 
A.  The FCC’s net neutrality initiatives 
  The FCC first explicitly addressed the issue of net neutrality in its Policy Statement of 
2005.  As discussed, the Policy Statement adopted several “principles” (not binding rules) 
exhorting broadband providers to let their customers access the Internet applications and content 
of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement and sound network management.  As 
noted, the FCC has considered, to date, two significant allegations that broadband providers have 
violated these principles.  The first—the Madison River matter—actually predated the issuance 
of the Policy Statement.  There, a small rural telephone company was accused of blocking the 
ports used for VoIP services; the FCC opened an enforcement proceeding; and the telephone 
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company quickly capitulated by settling the matter for a nominal fee.
62  That settlement 
precluded the FCC from having to explain the source, if any, of its regulatory authority to bring 
this enforcement action.  More recently, the FCC has opened proceedings in response to 
allegations that Comcast improperly suppressed a type of peer-to-peer file-sharing technology 
(BitTorrent).
63  As of this writing, those proceedings remain pending. 
  Both the Madison River and Comcast proceedings involved alleged violations of the anti-
blocking principle.  In 2007, the FCC separately issued a Notice of Inquiry into whether it should 
impose nondiscrimination rules on broadband providers as well.  The Notice was remarkably 
brief, given the complexity of the subject matter, and most industry analysts concluded that the 
Commission issued it only half-heartedly, in response to political pressure, and that it had no 
interest in resolving the issue before the end of the present administration.  Indeed, during the 
open meeting in which the Republican-led Commission issued the Notice, Republican 
Commissioner Robert McDowell, considered a swing vote on network access issues, had the 
following telling exchange with Wireline Competition Bureau Chief Thomas Navin:   
Commissioner McDowell:  “[T]o the best of your knowledge, since the Madison 
River  case and the adoption of the FCC’s net neutrality principals, have any 
complaints, formal or informal, been filed with the Commission under the net 
neutrality umbrella?”   
Mr. Navin:  “Not that we are aware.  Indeed, I think that is what made writing the 
NOI so difficult, is the lack of real world problems to base the NOI on.”
64
McDowell followed up with a written statement expressing his own skepticism that net neutrality 
advocates had yet demonstrated any market failure warranting government intervention.
65  
  One of the great unanswered questions presented by the Notice is whether the FCC has 
existing authority to issue net neutrality rules in general and “nondiscrimination” rules in 
particular.  The reason relates to the Commission’s own decision to remove broadband services 
from the ambit of its explicit authority to regulate common carriers.  In Brand X, the Supreme 
Court upheld the FCC’s determination that broadband Internet access should be characterized as 
                                                 
62See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
63See supra note 21-26 and accompanying text. 
64Tr. of Open Commission Meeting, Mar. 22, 2007 (http://www.fcc.gov/ realaudio/mt032207.ram). 
65Statement of Commissioner Robert McDowell on Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, WC Docket 
No. 07-52 (Mar. 22, 2007) (http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-31A6.pdf) (“For those who 
fear or allege market failure, this NOI gives them an opportunity to present detailed evidence, of which we have 
none, thus far.”).  
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an “information service” without a “telecommunications service” component within the 
Communications Act’s arcane vocabulary.
66  Because a telecommunications provider “shall be 
treated as a common carrier under this [Act] only to the extent that it is engaged in providing 
telecommunications services,”
67 the upshot of the Brand X ruling is that broadband providers fall 
outside the FCC’s Title II authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of “common 
carriers.”  In a string of recent orders, the FCC has fully embraced that conclusion, reasoning that 
the broadband access market is dynamic and competitive enough that common-carrier-type 
(“economic”) regulation would do more harm than good.  For example, in its Wireline 
Broadband Order of 2005, the Commission extended the deregulatory policies it had applied to 
cable modem services in 2002 and concluded that continued application of common carrier 
regulation to any broadband access providers, including traditional telephone companies, would 
serve no purpose beyond the destruction of healthy investment incentives.
68  On that basis, the 
Commission categorically exempted broadband providers from the “nondiscrimination” rules it 
had imposed, in the Computer Inquiry proceedings, to govern the dealings of wireline broadband 
carriers with unaffiliated ISPs.   
  Because broadband Internet access services fall outside the scope of Title II, the FCC 
could now regulate them only under its residual authority under Title I.  But that authority 
merely allows the Commission to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulation, and 
issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its 
functions.”
69  It is unclear whether this provision would support any FCC decision to impose 
common-carrier-style net neutrality rules.  As a general matter, if the FCC wishes to adopt rules 
that no substantive provision of the Communications Act explicitly authorizes it to adopt, it may 
not simply assert jurisdiction on the ground that the regulated subject matter involves interstate 
“communications by wire and radio.”
70  Instead, any exercise of such jurisdiction “must be 
‘reasonably ancillary’ to other express provisions” in the Communications Act and “cannot be 
‘inconsistent’ with other provisions of the Act.”
71  As the D.C. Circuit explained, “[w]ere an 
                                                 
66545 U.S. 967. 
6747 U.S.C. § 153(44).   
68See Wireline Broadband Order, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 at ¶¶ 19, 44.   
6947 U.S.C. § 154(i) (“Section 4(i)”).   
7047 U.S.C. § 151; see also 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).   
71Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-09 (1979); American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 701 
(D.C. Cir. 2005).   
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agency afforded carte blanche under such a broad provision, irrespective of subsequent 
congressional acts that did not squarely prohibit action, it would be able to expand greatly its 
regulatory reach.”
72   
  In this context, the FCC has concluded that it has authority to impose certain types of 
non-economic regulations on Title I broadband services, including “any consumer protection, 
network reliability, or national security obligation[s]” that relate to the FCC’s explicit 
jurisdiction under Title II to protect consumer privacy, ensure network access for the disabled, 
police “slamming” and fraudulent billing practices, and serve the needs of law enforcement.
73  
But it would be much more difficult for the FCC to impose common carrier requirements on 
broadband providers under its interstitial Title I authority after concluding (with the Supreme 
Court’s approval) that broadband providers do not provide “common carrier” services within the 
meaning of the Communications Act and should not be treated as though they do.
74  Indeed, the 
Commission itself has cast doubt on whether it believes Congress authorized it to take that step.  
In the Wireline Broadband Order, it concluded that “th[e] negative impact” that common carrier 
regulation of broadband services would have on deployment and innovation would be 
“particularly troubling in view of Congress’ clear and express policy goal of ensuring broadband 
deployment, and its directive that we remove barriers to that deployment[.]”
75   
  In short, the Commission could lawfully impose “nondiscrimination” requirements on 
broadband providers only if, at a minimum, it first develops a compelling empirical basis for 
concluding that it has erred in repeatedly concluding that economic regulation of broadband 
services would disserve Congress’s objectives.  Like any reversal of course reversal by an 
administrative agency, this one would likely receive a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny.  
The agency’s opponents could also plausibly argue that net neutrality rules are not “reasonably 
ancillary to” any of the Commission’s explicit statutory responsibilities and that they would 
therefore “be ancillary to nothing.”
76  Ultimately, however, few meaningful standards govern 
                                                 
72Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 309 F.3d at 806. 
73Wireline Broadband Order, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 at ¶¶ 109-110. 
74Ironically, the Supreme Court simultaneously suggested in dicta that Title I may well authorize the Commission to 
regulate broadband Internet access.  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (suggesting that “the Commission remains free to 
impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction,” while noting that the 
Commission “has invited comment on whether it can and should do so”). 
75Wireline Broadband Order, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 at ¶ 44 (referring to Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-104, Title VII, § 706, 110 Stat. 153 (47 U.S.C. § 157 note)); see also id. at ¶¶ 19, 65-73.   
76American Library Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 702; cf. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 41, 60-61 (2003) (“Unlike previous regulations based on its Title I authority, the FCC’s potential 
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disputes about the scope of the FCC’s Title I “ancillary” jurisdiction.  The only sure way to know 
whether an FCC assertion of such jurisdiction is valid is to await the outcome of whatever 
judicial challenge is brought to it. 
 
B.  The FTC’s net neutrality initiatives 
  In June 2007, the FTC concluded a much publicized year-long inquiry into net neutrality 
issues by adopting a “Staff Report” on its findings.
77  The Report canvassed the competing views 
and concluded that the Commission would adopt an essentially deregulatory wait-and-see 
approach.  The Report found that the broadband Internet access industry is “young and dynamic” 
and is “moving in the direction of more, not less, competition, including fast growth [and] 
declining prices for higher-quality service.”
78  The FTC further explained that “we are unaware 
of any significant market failure or demonstrated consumer harm from conduct by broadband 
providers.”
79  And it warned that “[p]olicy makers should be wary of enacting regulation solely 
to prevent prospective harm to consumer welfare,” both because there is no demonstrated need 
for such regulation and because “[i]ndustry-wide regulatory schemes—particularly those 
imposing general, one-size-fits-all restraints on business conduct—may well have adverse effects 
on consumer welfare.”
80  Nonetheless, the FTC added that it would “continue to devote 
substantial resources to maintaining competition and protecting consumers in the area of 
broadband Internet access” and would “continue to enforce the antitrust and consumer protection 
laws in evaluating conduct and business arrangements involving Internet access” should any 
market failures arise.
81    
                                                                                                                                                             
regulation of access to broadband platforms does not neatly fit as ‘reasonably ancillary’ to the Commission's 
traditional statutory responsibilities. . . . [T]he FCC suggests that its general mandate to oversee ‘advanced services’ 
and pursue their rollout—as opposed to any specific authority over, say, voice telephone service—justifies its 
oversight of broadband transmission.  This argument is both untested and quite novel, so it is unclear whether 
reviewing courts will accept it.”). 
77FTC Staff Report, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy (June 27, 2007) (“FTC Net Neutrality Report”) 
(http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf).  One of the FTC’s five members (Commissioner 
Leibowitz) filed a short statement that was denominated a “concurrence” but seemed skeptical about some of the 
Report’s key findings.  Chairman Majoris and the other the three commissioners approved the Report without 
further comment.  
78FTC Net Neutrality Report, supra note 77, at 10-11. 
79Id. at 11. 
80Id.  
81Id. at 12. 
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  Just as significant as the FTC’s conclusion on the merits of net neutrality proposals, 
however, was the agency’s assertion of authority to address those proposals in the first place.  
Formally adopting a position that top FTC officials had espoused before Congress,
82 the FTC 
claimed—almost in passing—that it had full jurisdiction to regulate broadband providers if and 
when it ever changes its mind about the balance of policy concerns.
83  This is an important and 
potentially controversial development, and it is worth exploring the basic contours of the FTC’s 
authority to regulate the telecommunications industry.   
  Until recently, it was undisputed that the FCC exclusively occupied the field of 
telecommunications regulation, supplemented only by the antitrust oversight of the Justice 
Department.  The FTC has played little role in the development of this industry because, in 1914, 
Congress fenced off from the FTC’s jurisdiction the substantive subject areas assigned to other 
regulatory agencies.
84  Here, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits the FTC 
from exercising authority over “common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,”
85 a 
category that includes the later-enacted Communications Act of 1934.
86  In the Net Neutrality 
Report, however, the FTC contended that, because Brand X holds that broadband Internet access 
providers are not “common carriers,” this “common carrier exemption” no longer applies to the 
services those providers offer.  That conclusion is not, however, quite as straightforward as it 
sounds.   
 As  discussed,  Brand X did uphold the FCC’s determination that broadband Internet 
access is an “information service” with no “telecommunications service” component.
87  And for 
purposes of the Communications Act, a “telecommunications carrier” (defined as a “provider of 
telecommunications services”) “shall be treated as a common carrier under this [Act] only to the 
extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services[.]”
88  It does not inevitably 
                                                 
82See, e.g., Testimony of William E. Kovacic, Commissioner, Federal Trade Comm’n, before the Senate Comm. On 
the Judiciary on FTC Jurisdiction Over Broadband Internet Access Services (June 14, 2006) 
(http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=1937&wit_id=5415). 
83FTC Net Neutrality Report, supra note 77, at 38, 43-47.   
84See generally id. at 38-42. 
8515 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2), 
86See 15 U.S.C. § 44. 
87For the key underlying FCC orders on this statutory characterization issue, see Declaratory Ruling and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities, 17 
FCC Rcd 4798, 4821-22 (2002), aff’d, Brand X, supra; Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 10. 
8847 U.S.C. § 153(44) (emphasis added).  In light of this and similar provisions, the FCC has concluded that “the 
term ‘telecommunications carrier’ . . . . means essentially the same [thing] as common carrier” for purposes of the 
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follow, however, that broadband providers no longer qualify as “common carriers” for purposes 
of the FTC Act.
89  As two courts of appeals have held, the “common carrier exemption” in the 
FTC Act is to be construed not by reference to other statutes, but on its own terms, according to 
its “ordinary sense . . . when Congress . . . create[d] the exemption” in the FTC Act in 1914.
90  
And there is in particular “no statutory basis for . . . concluding” that “the correct definition for 
‘common carrier’ under the FTC Act is found in the Communications Act.”
91  Thus, whether 
broadband Internet access providers should be deemed “common carriers” exempt from the 
FTC’s jurisdiction is a question that Brand X itself—and the FCC scheme it upholds—do not 
automatically resolve.  The question turns instead on whether Internet access services exhibit the 
common law characteristics of “common carriage.”  And the Communications Act definition of 
the term does not necessarily track that common law heritage.  To the contrary, the FCC has 
adopted a specialized definition for the term that, for policy reasons, is narrower than the 
common law definition in one key respect.   
  The traditional definition of “common carrier” focuses simply on whether a provider 
“holds himself out to serve indifferently all potential users.”
92  This traditional definition could 
have been construed to encompass many providers of “enhanced services” (the forerunners of 
today’s Internet access services) because those services were in fact often sold on standardized 
terms to the public at large—as many consumer broadband services are still today.  When it 
addressed the issue in the 1980s, the FCC wished to avoid that outcome for purposes of 
implementing the Communications Act, because it sought to insulate the fledgling class of 
enhanced service providers from the compulsory “economic regulation” that Title II of that Act 
then automatically imposed on all “common carriers.”
93  The FCC thus tweaked the definition of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Communications Act.  Virgin Islands Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (some internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
89See FTC Net Neutrality Report 38 (arguing that, although “the FTC’s enforcement authority under the FTC Act 
does not reach ‘common carriers,’ . . . [a]n entity is a common carrier . . . only with respect to services that it 
provides on a common carrier basis,” citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)). 
90FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2006); see also FTC v.  Miller, 549 F.2d 542, 455-56 (7th Cir. 
1977).   
91Verity Int’l, 443 F.3d at 58.  The FTC’s contrary assumption is reminiscent of the claim, rejected by the D.C. 
Circuit, that the term “telecommunications carrier” has the same narrow meaning in the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) that it has in the Communications Act, as interpreted in Brand X.  As the D.C. 
Circuit held, that argument “falls apart because CALEA and the Telecom Act are different statutes, and Brand X 
was a different case.”  American Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
92National Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“NARUC”).   
93See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 
77 F.C.C.2d 384, ¶ 123 (1980) (“Admittedly, vendors of enhanced services also have the ability, if they so desire, to 
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“common carrier” a bit to avoid that outcome.  It added “[a] second prerequisite to common 
carrier status . . . with peculiar applicability to the communications field”—namely, whether the 
provider allows customers to “transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing,”
94 a 
criterion that, the Commission found, excludes data-processing-based services such as broadband 
Internet access.
95  When Congress amended the Communications Act in 1996, it essentially 
codified the FCC’s approach by enacting a distinction between “telecommunications services” 
(i.e., common carrier services) and “information services” (i.e., enhanced services).
96  For this 
policy-laden reason, the Communications Act regime treats broadband Internet access as an 
“information service”—and thus not as a “common carrier” service—whether or not the service 
is offered indiscriminately to the public, and whether or not it would qualify as a “common 
carrier” service under the traditional definition.   
  That is reason enough to hesitate before concluding that a carrier falls outside the 
“common carrier exemption,” and thus inside the FTC’s jurisdiction, simply because it does not 
qualify as a common carrier under federal telecommunications law.  So long as the FCC 
continues asserting its own authority in this area, moreover, the FTC’s jurisdictional ambitions 
seem potentially at odds with the animating purpose of the carrier carrier exemption—a 
“traditional policy of dividing regulatory responsibilities along industry lines,”
97 and of 
“preventing [the] inter-agency conflict[s]” that would arise if the FTC began regulating 
industries that are already subject to the comprehensive regulatory authority of specialized 
agencies such as the FCC.
98  There is obviously some tension between that purpose and the 
FTC’s conclusion that both it “and the FCC share jurisdiction over broadband Internet access, 
with each playing an important role in protecting competition and consumers in this area.”
99  
Without any clear division of responsibilities among those three agencies, this amorphous and 
redundant jurisdictional scheme seems like precisely the outcome Congress sought to avoid.  Of 
course, such redundancy concerns would be allayed to the extent that, for the reasons discussed 
                                                                                                                                                             
provide these services on an indiscriminate basis.  Presumably, some do.  But this is not a sufficient basis for 
imposing the burdens that go with common carrier status.”).  The FCC would not face the same conundrum today, 
because in 1996 Act, Congress enabled the Commission to “forbear” from legacy requirements that no longer make 
sense.  See 47 U.S.C. § 160; compare MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
94NARUC, 533 F.2d at 609. 
95See generally Brand X, 545 U.S. at 977-79 
9647 U.S.C. § 153(20), (46).   
97Miller, 549 F.2d at 459. 
98Verity Int’l, 443 F.3d at 57; see also Miller, 549 F.2d at 457.   
99FTC Net Neutrality Report, supra note 77, at 11. 
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in Part II.A above, the FCC is found to lack Title I authority to impose economic regulation on 
broadband providers.  
 
C.  The case against regulatory redundancy 
  In sum, there are non-trivial legal obstacles to the jurisdiction of either the FCC or the 
FTC to impose, under current law, common-carrier-style “net neutrality” obligations on 
broadband Internet access providers.  No matter what position one takes about net neutrality on 
the merits, these open jurisdictional questions are unfortunate, because regulatory uncertainty is 
toxic for this uniquely dynamic industry.   
  There are two ways to resolve that uncertainty.  One is to let the courts sort it out.  The 
obvious disadvantage of that approach is that the courts have a dismal track record in bringing 
such disputes to a prompt and efficient resolution.
100  The second option is for Congress to 
clarify precisely who does, and who does not, have authority to address the antitrust-oriented 
concerns at the heart of net neutrality proposals.  In principle, this is the preferred solution, and 
there is cause for guarded optimism that Congress will indeed step in.  Comprehensive reform of 
telecommunications law is long overdue, in part because, when Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, it did not foresee how much broadband Internet access would 
revolutionize every facet of the telecommunications industry.
101  And the FTC has recently 
ratcheted up its longstanding efforts to persuade Congress to repeal the common carrier 
exemption outright, in order to remove any uncertainty about its authority to remedy antitrust 
and consumer-protection violations in the Internet access market.   
  My main objective here is to consider how  Congress should divide up regulatory 
jurisdiction for net neutrality disputes if Congress addresses that issue.  Part III below argues for 
a particular division of jurisdiction that reflects various pragmatic and public choice concerns.  
But I must first address a threshold question:  whether there is any need to divide up jurisdiction 
in the first place, given the stated intentions of both the FCC and the FTC to maintain a key 
oversight role in this area.  Would it be problematic if, as the FTC proposes, “the federal antitrust 
agencies, the FTC and the DOJ, and the FCC share jurisdiction over broadband Internet access, 
                                                 
100See Nuechterlein & Weiser, Digital Crossroads, supra note 5, at 421-22. 
101Id. at 407-11. 
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with each playing an important role in protecting competition and consumers in this area,”
102 but 
without any clear statutory division of labor?  Suppose, for example, that for the foreseeable 
future, the FTC and the FCC, both purporting to apply basic competition law principles, examine 
the same industry practices and make independent determinations about which practices require 
government intervention and which do not.  Would that be a problem?  
  Indeed it would be a problem, and not just for the obvious reason that bureaucratic 
duplication wastes taxpayer dollars.  More fundamentally, such duplication would imperil 
consumer welfare by systematically increasing both regulatory uncertainty and the risk of 
regulatory overreaching.   
  Let’s first address the uncertainty concern.  Both the FCC and the FTC are independent, 
multi-member agencies characterized by political intrigue and chronic delay (although, to be fair 
to the FTC, the FCC is the more intrigue-ridden and dilatory of the two agencies).  Permitting 
these separate institutions to conduct drawn-out, highly consequential proceedings in parallel, on 
the same set of issues but with potentially conflicting outcomes, would exacerbate the regulatory 
indeterminacy that has beset the telecommunications industry for the past ten years.  I have 
previously argued that the federal government should more aggressively preempt state-level 
telecommunications regulation not because states are less likely than the federal government to 
make good decisions on the merits, but because state regulation adds a new layer of regulatory 
uncertainty to the industry, making capital investments riskier than they would otherwise be and 
thereby deterring welfare-maximizing investments on the margin.
103  For similar reasons, one 
federal agency—not two—should have authority to resolve any given net neutrality dispute. 
  Second, jurisdictional duplication would almost inevitably distort the federal 
government’s substantive decisionmaking in favor of inefficient over-regulation.  That follows as 
a matter of both logic and Realpolitik.  I will address the logical point first.   
  Any regulatory decision about whether to intervene in a market involves a cost-benefit 
analysis, in which the regulator weighs the perceived benefits of intervention against the short-
term and long-term costs, including the costs of unintended consequences.  That weighing of 
competing values is inherently subjective and will necessarily produce, some percentage of the 
time, what will turn out later to have been errors of commission and omission:  cases where, in 
                                                 
102FTC Net Neutrality Report, supra note 77, at 11. 
103See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Incentives to Speak Honestly About Incentives:  The Need for Structural Reform of 
the Local Competition Debate, 2 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 399 (2003). 
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hindsight, an agency intervened in the market but should not have (“false positives”) and cases 
where it did not intervene but should have (“false negatives”).  Public choice theorists might 
argue about whether a single agency, acting alone, is more likely to commit false positives 
(because it overvalues the short-term benefits of intervention and undervalues the long-term 
costs) or false negatives (because the major corporate targets of regulation can bring powerful 
political pressure to bear in favor of their own deregulatory objectives).
104  F o r  i m m e d i a t e  
purposes, however, I will assume that each agency will produce approximately the same basic 
quantum of false positives and false negatives. 
  Now suppose that Congress assigns oversight of a given subject matter to two peer 
federal agencies, neither of which has the explicit power to veto the other’s decisions.  The 
logical result will be a systematic skewing of results in favor of false positives (i.e., 
overregulation).  That is because, even if one assumes a random distribution of false positives 
and false negatives, each agency can “correct” the other’s false negatives simply by intervening 
in the market when the other has declined to do so, whereas neither can “correct” the other’s 
false positives.  If one agency concludes that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs and 
the other reaches precisely the opposite conclusion, the first, pro-regulation agency will “win” 
the dispute, because the anti-regulation agency can do nothing to stop the first agency from 
intervening in the market.  This chart illustrates the problem (in an simplified form) by 
highlighting what happens in the four basic scenarios that can arise when two peer agencies are 
presented with a binary choice between intervention and reliance on the free market: 
 
                                                 
104Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (2005), 
with William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 36-42 (1971). 
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  In short, where two peer agencies exercise redundant jurisdiction, the government (writ 
large) will intervene frequently in the market, even though, in a range of cases, one of the two 
government decisionmakers will have concluded that intervention is inappropriate and harmful.  
This problem arises only when agencies are “peers” in the sense that, if one acts, the other cannot 
stop it.  Significantly, the same problem does not arise when Congress assigns concurrent 
jurisdiction to the FCC and state  regulators over the same subject matter.  In that context, 
whenever the FCC makes a discrete policy judgment about the relative costs and benefits of 
regulatory intervention, that judgment binds the states, whether the judgment comes out for or 
against such intervention.  Indeed, that is a staple of federal preemption law.  As the Supreme 
Court decided in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
105 a federal agency’s decision not to 
impose given regulatory obligations on an industry, if that decision reflects a substantive 
judgment that regulation is inappropriate, can preempt the states from imposing similar 
obligations even when the federal agency does not expressly announce an intent to preempt.   
  To this point, I have addressed the concerns about duplicative peer-agency jurisdiction in 
the abstract.  But the nature of the net neutrality debate only intensifies those concerns.  As a 
glance at SavetheInternet.com makes clear, popular advocacy for net neutrality regulation is 
emotional and Manichean:  it portrays the issues as a war of good (edge providers) against evil 
(access providers), with barely a nod to the complex economic trade-offs at stake.  That 
advocacy is often uncritically accepted by the popular media, and it has surfaced, largely 
unfiltered by economic nuance, into the official platforms of several presidential campaigns.
106  
If it becomes official policy, even the most conscientious regulators will err on the side of market 
intervention in close cases, because no administration wishes to seem indifferent to the core 
agendas of its main constituencies.   
  For that reason, false positives would proliferate even if only one federal agency had 
responsibility for resolving net neutrality disputes.  That is reason enough to limit to one the 
number of peer agencies with jurisdiction over the dispute, because the bias toward inefficient 
over-regulation would be even greater if each of two federal agencies were competing to show 
its greater fidelity to this constituency’s agenda (and, as noted, if each had effective veto power 
over the other’s false negatives but not false positives).  It is also, as I discuss below, a key 
                                                 
105529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
106See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 
 36 
reason to assign responsibility for this emotionally charged field to a generalist agency that does 
not focus exclusively on one industry and is thus less subject to capture by interest groups.  In all 
events, the least attractive of the institutional options is the one the FCC and the FTC implicitly 
advocate:  a regime in which each agency shares concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject 
matter.   
  Conceivably, the two agencies could mitigate these concerns by negotiating an effective 
division of their respective responsibilities into non-overlapping spheres of responsibility.  But 
there is little basis for optimism on this score.  True, the FTC and the Justice Department have 
long avoided duplication through a series of bilateral agreements that allocate oversight of 
specified industries to one agency or the other.  These “clearance agreements” can be 
contentious, and they require continuous renegotiation as the boundaries between industries shift 
with changing economic conditions.  But the process usually manages to avoid redundant 
antitrust oversight by both the FTC and the Justice Department.  The FCC, too, has occasionally 
agreed to let the FTC take exclusive responsibility for certain consumer-protection issues that are 
technically within both agencies’ jurisdiction but seem more appropriately handled by consumer-
protection officials than by telecommunications regulators.
107   
  But there is no reason to expect that either the FTC or the FCC would cede jurisdiction to 
the other agency over core net neutrality disputes.  All of the FTC’s public statements suggest an 
eagerness to play a key role in shaping competition policy for the Internet in response to any 
perceived market failures.  The FCC is similarly disposed to play such a role; indeed, pointing to 
the legacy of the Computer Inquiry rules, the Commission has long viewed itself as the Internet’s 
nurturer-in-chief.
108  Neither of these agencies would likely abandon the glamour of this field in 
deference to the other’s greater “expertise.”  Any limitation on either agency’s power would 
have to come from jurisdictional limitations in existing or future legislation. 
 
                                                 
107See, e.g., Annual Report on the Do-Not-Call Registry, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 20 FCC Rcd 14306 ¶ 15 (2005) (ceding portion of responsibility for “do not call 
registry” to FTC); Final Rule, Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 50 Fed. Reg. 5583, 5584 ¶ 7 (Mar. 
14, 1985) (“The FTC is the agency with expertise in determining whether an advertisement is false or misleading . . . 
. Our limited resources can more effectively be devoted to other endeavors where our expertise is critical to 
protecting the public interest.”). 




III.  Leaving Antitrust Disputes to the Antitrust Authorities
  In Part I, I explained why net neutrality disputes are, at bottom, disputes about the proper 
application of core antitrust principles in this particularly volatile market setting.  In Part II, I 
explained why only one federal agency, rather than two, should have responsibility for resolving 
those disputes.  The final question now arises:  which agency?   
 
A.  The advantages of perspective 
  There are three major contenders for this role:  the FCC and the FTC, which have both 
already asserted jurisdiction over this area, and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, 
which has traditionally exercised antitrust oversight of the telecommunications industry, oversaw 
the breakup of the Bell System in 1984, and administered the ensuing consent decree until 1996.  
The threshold choice is between (i) a antitrust agency with general jurisdiction over multiple 
economic sectors (the FTC or DoJ) and (ii) a non-antitrust agency with specific jurisdiction over 
one economic sector (the FCC).  For several reasons, the first of these institutional options seems 
preferable to the second, at least as a means of resolving net neutrality disputes.   
  Today’s net neutrality debate is a study in rhetorical ugliness.  What it badly needs, if it is 
to be resolved properly, is a referee inclined towards calm objectivity and a rigorous adherence 
to economic principle.  In other words, it needs analytical perspective, a greater detachment from 
political forces, and an expertise in addressing the type of complex antitrust issues presented 
here.  And the FCC is less equipped to deliver on those aspirations than either of the two antitrust 
agencies.
109
  DoJ and the FTC have gained invaluable perspective on competition disputes by 
exercising, between them, oversight of the entire American economy.  That perspective allows 
them to keep their eyes on dispassionate antitrust analysis and diminishes the significance of 
lobbyists for particular interest groups.  When confronted with a dispute about whether a large 
firm’s business practices are “fair,” their first response tends to be:  “what type of competition 
dispute is presented here, and how does antitrust law frame the analysis for such disputes?”  
                                                 
109For other perspectives on this institutional choice, see, e.g., Progress and Freedom Foundation:  “Digital Age 
Communications Act:  Report of the Working Group on Institutional Reform,” Release 1.0 (Nov. 2006) 
(http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/061114dacainstitutionalreform1.0.pdf); Raymond L. Gifford, Testimony to 
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on “Reconsidering Our Communications Laws:  Ensuring Competition and 
Innovation” (June 16, 2006) (http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/060616gifford_com.pdf); see also Weiser, 
Next Frontier, supra note 4.  
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Obviously, in answering that question, the FTC and DoJ may be subject to any number of biases, 
but they are at least asking the right question.  In contrast, the FCC tends to focus on other 
questions.  First, because it is responsible only for a single economic sector, it must answer 
permanently and exclusively to a relatively narrow cast of market actors and to their 
congressional allies.  Thus, when presented with a competition dispute, the FCC tends to focus 
heavily on a political question:  “how can we reach a compromise that will expose us to the least 
political damage?”  The answer to that question is unlikely to correspond closely with what 
antitrust practitioners would consider the optimal economic answer.   
  Second, the FCC’s narrow focus on a single industry creates incentives for the agency to 
keep itself relevant by erring on the side of market intervention in close cases.  Consider an 
analogy.  One of the main criticisms of the federal independent counsel law was that a prosecutor 
hired to investigate just one set of potential defendants has perverse incentives to indict those 
defendants for marginal offenses that do not genuinely warrant indictment, because otherwise the 
prosecutor must conclude that his once high-profile job was unimportant and should be 
eliminated.
110  The advantage of generalist U.S. Attorney’s offices—and the advantage of 
generalist antitrust enforcement agencies—is that they must and do focus their limited resources 
on prosecuting only serious offenses that genuinely warrant government action.  The FCC lacks 
that advantage because, like an independent counsel, it has limited jurisdiction confined to a 
specific set of controversies.  Thus, whereas the Justice Department and the FTC must ask, 
“which competition offenses across the economy threaten the greatest harm to consumer 
welfare?”, the FCC too often asks:  “what do we need to do in order to remain important players 
in the telecommunications industry?”  Here, too, the answer to that question will often diverge 
from the answer that would best serve long-term consumer welfare. 
                                                 
110As the D.C. Circuit explained in its (ultimately reversed) decision invalidating the law on separation-of-powers 
grounds: 
  A person occupying this statutory office has, it seems to us, unique incentives to seek an 
indictment.  Our concern is based on the self-evident proposition that the whole raison d’etre of 
the independent counsel is not to administer the criminal law across a wide population, but rather 
to focus on one individual or group of individuals targeted at the inception of the office.  In effect, 
an entire self-sufficient government agency is created from scratch to investigate and perhaps 
prosecute a single individual.  The need to justify even the expense of an office dedicated solely to 
one goal must generate a reluctance to decide against indictment or to conclude the investigation 
absent near certainty that no indictment is possible or that no further leads remain.  And 
inevitably, the success of the office itself, in the public’s eyes, at least, must turn to some extent 
upon whether indictment and conviction are obtained. 
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 509-510 (footnote omitted), rev’d, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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  This difference in institutional perspectives is reinforced by the distinct statutory 
standards these agencies are required to apply.  When they address competition disputes, DoJ 
and the FTC are more or less bound by the antitrust laws and by court precedents applying those 
laws.
111  They cannot generally hold an economic actor liable for aggressive business practices 
unless they have support from objective principles honed during decades of antitrust 
enforcement.  Antitrust law thus anchors the activities of those agencies to economic principles 
tested over time and studied in a variety of markets.   
  In contrast, the FCC is often subject only to the loosest of statutory standards—for 
example, an obligation to serve “the public interest.”  Such “standards,” however, are 
conceptually empty and permit a wide range of outcomes, depending on the inclinations of 
whoever is in power.  This malleability in the FCC’s governing statute unmoors the Commission 
from time-tested economic analysis and exacerbates its susceptibility to expedient political 
compromise.   Similarly, whereas the FTC and DoJ are generally bound by antitrust precedent, 
the FCC is also freer to intervene more extensively in the market than is optimal from a 
consumer-welfare perspective, confident in the deference a court will extend to the 
Commission’s construction of its amorphous mandate.  It is true that reviewing courts—and 
particularly the D.C. Circuit—have occasionally invoked antitrust principles in deeming 
particularly interventionist FCC policies “unreasonable” for purposes of standard judicial review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
112  But this shadow antitrust review is no substitute for 
explicit adherence to antitrust principles as the governing rules of decision.  
                                                 
111I say “more or less” because, in a recent 3-2 decision, the FTC reasserted a long-dormant authority to issue cease-
and-desist orders against business practices the Commission deems “unfair methods of competition” under Section 5 
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), even when a given practice “‘does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of 
the antitrust laws.’”  Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, 
File No. 0510094 (FTC 2008) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).  Chairman 
Deborah Majoris dissented on the grounds that the Commission had previously limited its invocation of this Section 
5 authority for the most part “to matters in which respondents took actions short of a fully consummated [Sherman 
Act] Section 1 violation (but with clear potential to harm competition), such as invitations to collude”; that this 
limiting principle conforms to “the scholarly consensus that finds the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as currently 
interpreted, to be sufficiently encompassing to address nearly all matters that properly warrant competition policy 
enforcement”; and that grounding Section 5 authority in antitrust doctrine is necessary to accommodate “the 
insistence of the appellate courts that the Commission’s discretion is bounded and must adhere to limiting 
principles.”  Id. (dissenting statement of Chairman Majoris) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 
128, 138-40 (2d Cir. 1984).  Time will tell how broadly the FTC tries to apply this Section 5 authority and whether it 
will try to apply that authority to standard exclusionary-conduct (and related) claims typically asserted under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act. 
112See, e.g., United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[Antitrust] scholars have 
raised very serious questions about the wisdom of the essential facilities doctrine as a justification for judicial 
mandates of competitor access, and accompanying judicial price setting.  But a doctrine that is inadequate for that 
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  Those who support broad FCC jurisdiction might invoke two related but distinct 
rationales for preferring the FCC as the decisionmaker in this context.  The first is the 
proposition that the net neutrality dispute is so technologically complex that only an agency 
devoted to it exclusively can have the “expertise” necessary to resolve antitrust disputes 
correctly.  I am skeptical.  To begin with, the FCC’s technical experts are not serfs bound to any 
particular agency; they—and other experts from the outside world—could and would be assigned 
to whatever agency needs their expertise.  It is also implausible in any event to suggest that the 
net neutrality dispute is somehow more esoteric than any number of other highly technical 
disputes that are routinely addressed by the “generalist” antitrust agencies, such as the Microsoft 
antitrust suit litigated by DoJ, which involved the arcane economics of the software industry.
113  
  The second reason one might prefer the FCC as the arbiter of net neutrality disputes 
involves a normative judgment about the soundness of contemporary antitrust law.  Specifically, 
some have argued that antitrust theory is too restrictive, that it permits too many false negatives, 
and that society will be better off in the long run if the government intervenes more often in the 
marketplace than modern antitrust principles would permit.
114  This is obviously a disputed claim 
on the merits.
115  But if the claim were valid, the solution would be to reform antitrust principles 
themselves, across all industries, not to give particular agencies largely unconstrained authority 
to reshape particular industries without regard to those principles.   
  Some perspective is important here.  The following chart illustrates the national market 
share of the largest providers in selected Internet-related markets:
116  
                                                                                                                                                             
purpose may nonetheless offer useful concepts for agency guidance when Congress has directed an agency to 
provide competitor access in a specific industry.”) (internal citation omitted).  
113See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
114See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms:  Striking a Better 
Balance, 72 Antitrust L.J. 3, 36-51 (2004); Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization 
Analysis, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 151 (2004); see also Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: 
Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617 (1999). 
115See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Information and Antitrust, 2000 U. Chi. Legal. F. 1 (2000). 
116The sources for the figures in this chart are Top Operating System Market Share Trend, July, 2006 to June 2007 
(http://marketshare.hitslink.com/report.aspx?qprid=5;  Browser Market Share for June, 2007 (http:// 
marketshare.hitslink.com/report.aspx?qprid=0); Tom Krazit, Intel’s market share rises on AMD’s problems, CNET 
News.com, Apr. 24, 2007 (http://news.com.com/ 2100-1006_3-6178921.html); Eric Auchard, YouTube visits larger 
than rivals combined: survey, Reuters UK, June 28, 2007 (http://uk.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/ 
idUKN2742598120070628?pageNumber=1); Marshall Kirkpatrick, Hitwise—Google Continues to Grow Market 
Share, ReadWriteWeb, Dec. 11, 2007 (http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/hitwise_google_continues_to_ 
gr.php); Eric Bangeman, Microsoft, others suffer as Google’s web search share grows, Ars Technica (Feb. 28, 
2007) (http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070228-8946.html); Verizon Net Neutrality Comments, supra note 
46, at 52 (citing sources for broadband market shares).  The largest broadband provider (AT&T) has only about 22% 




No one suggests that Congress should establish specialized agencies to come up with new 
competitive principles to govern the PC operating system market (dominated by Microsoft), or 
the microchip market (dominated by Intel), or the Internet search market (dominated by Google), 
even though each of those markets is more concentrated than the broadband access market and 
arguably as integral to the Internet’s future.  In each of those contexts, there is a general 
consensus in favor of allowing the antitrust authorities to strike the right balance between 
allowing free-market forces to operate efficiently and prosecuting anticompetitive conduct that 
threatens long-term consumer welfare.  There is no reason to treat the net neutrality debate 
differently.   
 
B.  Challenges in the transition to antitrust oversight of net neutrality      
 disputes 
 
  As discussed, an optimal telecommunications policy regime would assign exclusive 
jurisdiction over net neutrality disputes to federal antitrust authorities.  Whether the FTC or the 
Justice Department’s Antitrust Division is better equipped to exercise such oversight is a difficult 
and complex question.  I have no conclusive views on that topic; indeed, I am still perplexed 
about why the federal government needs to have two antitrust enforcement agencies in the first 
place.  Nonetheless, I will briefly note some of the considerations that would be relevant to this 
                                                                                                                                                             
households (and because it faces competition within that footprint with cable companies and others).  If the graph 
were adjusted to show regional rather than national market shares, the broadband figure in any given region would 
obviously be higher, but it would still typically be no greater than 50-60%, similar to or lower than the market shares 
for the other listed industries.    
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institutional choice and then conclude with an observation about the need for the FCC’s 
continuing oversight of broadband policy generally, if not of net neutrality disputes specifically. 
  The FTC and the Antitrust Division have markedly different modes of operation.  The 
Antitrust Division is a pure litigating authority:  it can act only by persuading the courts to adopt 
its substantive positions on antitrust law.  In contrast, the FTC can pursue its antitrust agenda 
either by filing court actions or by prosecuting corporate defendants before the FTC’s 
administrative law judges.  In these ALJ proceedings, the Commission walls off its enforcement 
staff from the chairman and commissioners; the ALJ’s ultimate decisions (for or against the 
enforcement staff) are then subject to full review by the Commission itself, in a process that can 
consume several years; and the Commission’s final decisions are then subject to review by a 
federal court of appeals, which grants substantial deference to the FTC’s factual findings but not 
to its construction of federal antitrust law.
117   
  The Antitrust Division also tends to be more immune from political pressure than the 
FTC.  Like the Solicitor General, the Antitrust Division reports to the Attorney General and 
enjoys a long tradition of professional autonomy.  In contrast, the FTC, like the FCC, is an 
independent agency that effectively reports to the House and Senate oversight committees rather 
than the President.  And like the FCC, the FTC is a multi-member agency.  The multiplicity of 
commissioners presents a constant potential for log-rolling and intrigue, as various 
commissioners pursue the support of different political constituencies.  This problem is endemic 
to the structure of multi-member independent agencies,
118 although in practice it afflicts the FTC 
less than the FCC. 
  These are reasons to prefer the Antitrust Division over the FTC if one places supreme 
value on avoiding delay and shifting political influences in the resolution of antitrust disputes.  
There are nonetheless other factors that may favor entrusting net neutrality disputes to the FTC.   
  First, although such disputes are antitrust-oriented on the merits, they sometimes involve 
a consumer protection component as well.  For example, some have argued that Comcast’s 
principal error in the BitTorrent affair lay not in its threshold decision to constrain the bandwidth 
consumed by that technology, but in its failure to give fuller disclosure about that practice.  And 
Comcast’s opponents seek to hold Comcast liable not just for violations of fair competition 
                                                 
117E.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). 
118See generally Nuechterlein & Weiser, Digital Crossroads, supra note 5, at 420. 
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principles, but also for deceiving its own subscribers about the nature of the Internet access 
service they were buying.
119  One might plausibly argue that whatever agency exercises 
jurisdiction over the substantive antitrust issues raised by such disputes should also have 
jurisdiction over any ancillary consumer-protection issues as well.  The FTC has an entire 
Bureau (of Consumer Protection) devoted to the latter set of issues,
120 whereas the Justice 
Department has no consumer-protection authority with comparable scope or clout.
121
  The other main advantage the FTC has over the Antitrust Division as an institutional 
matter is that it is more familiar with the APA’s rulemaking process.  To be sure, unlike the 
FCC, the FTC does not  have plenary authority to adopt enforceable prospective rules on 
particular issues that arise within the scope of its statutory jurisdiction.  Instead, the FTC 
normally proceeds through post hoc adjudication and issues formal regulations only on topics 
that Congress has specifically designated for rulemaking, such as implementation of the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.
122  But the FTC is nonetheless a more natural choice 
than the Antitrust Division, which has no substantive rulemaking authority to speak of, if 
policymakers conclude that efficient resolution of today’s net neutrality debate requires, at least 
in the near- to medium term, partial reliance on prescriptive rules instead of full reliance on after-
the-fact enforcement actions.  Under a hybrid approach, the FTC might also create “safe 
harbors”—as both it and the Antitrust Division have done in other contexts—specifying business 
practices that will not give rise to later federal enforcement actions.  Such enforcement 
guidelines would not technically insulate potential defendants from private (or state) antitrust 
litigation, but the substantive antitrust judgments they reflect would likely be highly influential in 
practice. 
  A smooth transition to an antitrust regime for net neutrality disputes will also require the 
FCC to continue playing a key role on a range of non-antitrust-related broadband policy issues, 
                                                 
119See Free Press Pet., supra note 26, at 32-33. 
120Within the FTC, the Bureau of Competition handles antitrust cases targeting antitrust violations and “unfair 
methods of competition,” and the Bureau of Consumer Protection handles consumer protection cases targeting 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  The FTC’s third major subdivision—the 
Bureau of Economics—provides expert analysis for the other two bureaus and the Commission as a whole. 
121I do not wish to make too much of this point, for one could plausibly cite the same considerations as support for 
the contrary conclusion.  The FTC has been occasionally accused of blurring the lines between antitrust and 
consumer-protection principles to create hybrid, interventionist policies with no solid grounding in either antitrust 
law or consumer protection norms.  Such concerns would obviously not arise if Congress assigned exclusive 
oversight of net neutrality disputes to the Antitrust Division and confined the FTC’s role to consumer-protection 
measures. 
122Pub. L. 105-277, div. C, tit. XIII (Oct. 21, 1998), 112 Stat 2681-728, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6501–6506. 
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some of them highly technical.  For example, few would question the need for the FCC to 
implement such diverse issues as accommodating the needs of law enforcement under CALEA, 
requiring telecommunications networks to have adequate emergency-response capabilities, 
overseeing North American telephone-number resources, guaranteeing access to 
communications networks by people with disabilities, and supervising subsidy mechanisms for 
greater broadband deployment.   
  The FCC’s continued involvement may also be indispensable in a few regulatory areas—
such as spectrum management and network interconnection—that are sometimes closely related 
to the net neutrality debate.  For example, it will likely be the FCC, not the FTC or the Antitrust 
Division, that oversees the licensing of spectrum to wireless broadband companies and that 
decides what compensation is due for the exchange of traffic between broadband-originated 
VoIP traffic and the conventional telephone network.  Each of those regulatory areas overlaps to 
some extent with policy issues presented by the net neutrality debate.
123  For that reason, it will 
be important for Congress to draw clear and workable lines dividing the FCC’s continuing 
jurisdiction over such areas and the jurisdiction of federal antitrust authorities to resolve core net 
neutrality disputes.  That task will not be simple, but it will be necessary if policymakers are to 
manage an effective transition from legacy regulation to a more rational regime that subjects 
competition disputes in the telecommunications industry to the same economic principles 
applicable to competition disputes in other industries across the economy.  
                                                 
123See, e.g., Sidak, Consumer-Welfare Approach, supra note 4, at 416-22 (noting relationship between intercarrier 
compensation rules and the Madison River port-blocking controversy). 
 
 